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ABSTRACT
This dissertation discusses two separate aspects of commercial 
bank regulation. First, an attempt is made to discover which type 
of branching laws tends to promote the greatest social welfare. 
Currently there are three ways in which individual states may regulate 
branching by commercial banks. Unit-banking states allow no full 
service branching by banks; limited-branching states allow full ser­
vice branching on a less than statewide basis; and statewide-branching 
states allow banks to establish branches anywhere within state boun­
daries. To date, no rigorous study exists which attempts to determine 
if social welfare is a function of prevailing branching laws.
The second aim of the dissertation is to determine if the regula­
tion of new bank entry has served to reduce social welfare. At the 
present time both the federal government and state governments require 
prospective bank owners to apply for charters of operation. As shown 
in the dissertation, many of these applications have been denied. The 
result has been to lower the number of banks that a population in any 
area of the country might face.
An empirical test is formed in order to answer these two ques­
tions. The test uses a new dependent variable, the elasticity of 
loan demand for commercial banks. This variable is a result of the 
development of a theory of a banking firm, and is shown to be a better
viii
indicator of welfare losses than variables used in previous studies. 
The results of the empirical test show that the restriction of new 
bank entry has Indeed served to lower social welfare» and that of the 





STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Commercial banking in this country is, in the true sense of the 
term, a regulated industry. For example, interest rates that banks 
may offer on time deposits are regulated by the Federal Reserve, 
and/or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and banks are pre­
cluded from paying explicit interest on demand deposits or acquiring 
common stocks.
This dissertation focuses on two other Important, and closely 
related, aspects of regulation: (1) the alteration of the structure
of commercial banking by federal and state agencies who restrict entry 
of new banks into the Industry; and (2) the alteration of bank struc­
ture by state laws and agencies that regulated the extent to which 
existing banks can expand operations by establishing new branches.
By affecting bank structure, government regulation has an important 
impact on bank performance and social welfare.
Concerning Restrictions on New Bank Entry
The requirement that a new bank must receive a federal or state 
charter before it can begin operations is as old as the United States 
itself. The Intensity with which this requirement has been enforced,
1
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however, has been subject to variation. Before the Great Depression, 
obtaining a bank charter was relatively easy. The raising of minimum 
capital requirements was often the only obstacle for a prospective 
bank to overcome. When many banks failed during the Depression, the 
easy-chartering policy received much of the blame for these failures 
because, it was believed, the policy had created an "overbanked" 
situation.
The Banking Act of 1935, and many state laws passed about the 
same time, were designed to curb the high rate of bank failure that 
had characterized the Depression. As a result of these laws, the 
organizers of a prospective bank must demonstrate to the chartering 
agency that there is a public need for a new bank and that the new 
bank will be soundly managed and profitable without causing serious 
losses to existing banks. The Impact of these new guidelines for 
bank chartering has been to reduce the rate of new bank formation 
over the last forty years.
This restrictive chartering policy has been an effort to serve 
the public interest. In most industries, however, we seek to encour­
age competition on the grounds that if competitive pressures are 
strong enough to force some of the less efficient firms out of busi­
ness, that is just part of the game. It is the efficient firms 
operating profitably with relatively low prices that will survive. 
This line of reasoning is not generally carried over into banking, 
where it is widely felt that banks must be shielded against the 
vigorous competition that characterizes some industries. The reason
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for this difference lies in the view that the social costs of bank 
failure are considered to outweigh whatever inefficiency results 
from a policy of reducing competition by restricting new bank entry.
The major reason, then, for the restriction of new bank entry 
is the fear of what failure of banks will do to the economy. Whereas 
in other industries a failure falls primarily upon the owners of 
the businesses, a bank failure, it is felt, imposes losses on deposi­
tors and also disrupts the payments mechanism. It has long been 
believed that the dangers of bank failure are so serious that govern­
ment regulation is necessary to prevent them.
The problem with this argument is that a link between restricting 
new bank entry and preventing widespread bank failures is highly 
questionable in today's economy. The failure of so many banks during 
the Depression was due in large part to the mass withdrawal of deposits 
by customers of the banks. Today, federal deposit insurance guaran­
tees to the depositor that his or her deposits, up to $40,000, remain 
secure even if the bank fails. This should in itself alleviate any 
fears of a recurring bank crisis as the nation witnessed during the 
Great Depression. If the possibility of widespread bank failures is 
remote, the main impact of legal restrictions on new bank entry would 
appear to be an Increased monopoly position for the commercial banking 
industry, with all its social implications.
Concerning Regulations on Branching
The various states can also alter the banking structure by their 
policies concerning the establishment of branches by existing banks.
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State laws concerning branching apply to both nationally-chartered 
and state-chartered banks. Unit-banking states, such as Minnesota, 
allow no branch banking whatsoever, or restrict it to only one 
llmited-service branch within the city limits in which the main office 
resides. Limited-branching states may Impose branching restrictions 
in one of two main forms. Some limited-branching states, such as 
Tennessee and Louisiana, allow banks to branch only within the county 
lines in which the main office resides. Other limited-branching 
states, such as New York and Mississippi, allow banks to branch into 
neighboring counties, but do not allow banks to establish branches 
statewide. A statewide-branching state, such as California, allows 
a bank whose main office is in that state to establish branches any­
where within state boundaries.
Most states originally did not allow banks to establish branches, 
and as late as 1910, only twelve states allowed it. This situation 
has changed slowly in the direction of more liberal branching laws, so 
that as of the end of 1975 seventeen states allowed limited-area 
branching and twenty states allowed statewide branching. Only recently, 
in 1973, Arkansas and Iowa, previously unit-banking states, began to 
allow branching on a limited basis, and New Jersey, previously a 
limited-branching state, began to allow statewide branching.
While there is some tendency toward more liberal branching laws, 
there exists no widespread agreement as to whether more liberal branch­
ing laws Improve social welfare by forcing banks to become more 
competitive. One line of reasoning runs that increased liberalization
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of branching laws may bring greater competition by allowing more banks 
to establish a branch in any given market area. On the other hand, a 
second argument holds that more liberal branching laws could result in 
greater monopoly power for existing banks, which can spread their 
operations over a larger area, securing markets that could have been 
claimed by newly created banks. The more liberal are branching laws, 
the stronger are both of these contradictory tendencies. The net 
effect of branching on competition in banking has never been firmly 
established.
STATEMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES
Two major hypotheses are tested in this dissertation. The first 
hypothesis is that official restrictions on new bank entry have served 
to decrease social welfare by Increasing the monopoly power of banks 
in any one area. This hypothesis will be tested while holding the 
effect of branching laws constant, as there may be differences in 
monopoly power due to differences in branching laws. The hypothesis, 
then, is that for any given branching law, policies that serve to 
restrict the entry of new banks will increase monopoly power, and thus 
lower social welfare from what it would otherwise be.
The second hypothesis involves an attempt to discover what impli­
cations branching laws have for social welfare. A priori, one cannot 
state whether more liberal branching laws tend to Increase or decrease 
social welfare.
6
On the one hand, one might expect that competition is inten­
sified, and social welfare increased, the more liberal are branching 
laws. This reasoning is based on the belief that the larger the 
geographical area over which banks can establish branches, the more 
potential competitors any one bank may face.
On the other hand, one must consider that the more liberal are 
branching laws, the less will be the need for chartering officials 
to supply additional banking services by chartering a new bank. 
Rather, any additional banking services can be provided by the 
establishment of a branch of an existing bank. And, the more liberal 
the branching law, the more widespread is this tendency.
The second hypothesis of this dissertation will be that the 
second tendency is more powerful than the first. That is, the more 
liberal are branching laws the greater are the losses to social wel­
fare. Of the three types of branching laws that exist, unit-banking 
leads to the lowest welfare losses and statewide-branching to the 
greatest.
METHODOLOGY
Sample Selection and Size
In order to evaluate the two hypotheses, the entire national 
banking market will be studied. The states will be separated into 
three distinct subgroups according to the relevant branching laws. 
Each state is further subdivided into various economic regions.
7
These regions are Che economic areas listed by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in its annual publication. Bank 
Operating Statistics. There are 297 of these regions, of which 
167 are in unit-banking states, 111 are in limited-branching states, 
and 19 are in statewide-branching states.1 The latter figure is 
relatively low, of course, because the states themselves are the 
economic areas. The FDIC feels that in these states, statewide 
branching is so prevalent that contrasting data by subsections of 
the state would be meaningless since any bank may establish a branch 
anywhere throughout the state. Thus, area differentials on a smaller 
than statewide basis would not Indicate true differences in the 
behavior of different banks.
The Model
To test the two hypotheses, a statistical model will be developed. 
The average elasticity of loan demand, E^, for each economic area for 
the years 1968-1974 will be regressed against ten independent variables. 
For this study, the three most important of these variables are XI, 
population per bank for each economic area, and two dummy variables,
1Since Arkansas, Iowa, and New Jersey only recently changed their 
branching laws, and since the time period of this study encompasses 
the years 1968-1974, these three states, for purposes of this disser­
tation, will be classified according to the branching laws prevailing 
in those states before 1973. It is highly unlikely that the full 
impact of the changes in their branching laws was felt during the 
last two years of the time period in question.
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X9 and X10, which will indicate the type of branching law existing 
in that area. Specifically, X9 and X10 both assume values of 0 
when a given economic area is located In a unit-banking state. When 
the economic area is in a limited-branching state, X9 assumes a value 
of 1 and X10 assumes a value of 0. When the economic area is in a 
statewide-branching state, X9 assumes a value of 0 and X10 assumes a 
value of 1 .
TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
As stated above, the dummy variable for branching laws is impor­
tant for testing both hypotheses. Concerning the first hypothesis, 
it is important that the effects of branching on the elasticity of 
loan demand be held constant while the effects of population per 
bank are analyzed. It is the latter variable which indicates the 
extent of restrictions on new bank entry in any given area. The 
greater the population per bank, ceteris paribus, the more restric­
tive have been entry conditions. If this variable is statistically 
significant, and negatively related to the elasticity of loan demand, 
then the first hypothesis can be accepted. Restrictions on new bank 
entry will have been found to lower social welfare by making banks 
less competitive in any given area.
The dummy variables will be the basis of accepting or rejecting 
the second hypothesis. If one accepts the view that competition 
increases the more liberal branching laws become, then this should 
be reflected in the coefficients for the dummy variables.
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Specifically, both X9 and X10 should be positive and statistically 
significant. Furthermore, the coefficient for X10 should be larger 
than the coefficient for X9. If they are both positive and statis­
tically significant, then it means that at a given level of population 
per bank, both limited and statewide-branching result in greater 
elasticities of loan demand than does unit-banking. If the coefficient 
for X10 is larger than the coefficient for X9, then it means that at 
a given level of population per bank statewide-branching leads to a 
greater elasticity of loan demand than does limited-branching.
However, if neither dummy variable is statistically significant 
then the second hypothesis of the dissertation, that more liberal 
branching laws lead to poorer performance by banks, can be accepted. 
Statistically insignificant dummy variables Indicate that at any 
given level of population per bank, there is no difference in perfor­
mance among the three branching laws. But, as will be shown In 
Chapter II, population per bank rises the more liberal are branching 
laws. If the model shows that the elasticity of loan demand is 
negatively related to population per bank, then the hypothesis that 
unit-banking leads to better performance, and thus serves to lower 
losses in social welfare, can be accepted.
Furthermore, if the first hypothesis is accepted, establishing 
the fact that the elasticity of loan demand is a negative function 
of population per bank, the extent of welfare losses due to regulating
2entry into banking will be estimated. The first thing to be done 
will be to estimate the actual welfare losses in each area. These 
losses, however, are due to both restrictions on new bank entry and 
market imperfections in banking. Next, the number of banks that 
would have existed in the absence of regulation in each of the 297 
economic areas will be estimated. This results in a lower value for 
population per bank in all the areas, which in turn will raise the 
elasticity of loan demand, indicating a reduction in welfare losses. 
Both of these losses will be separately summed over all areas to 
arrive at an estimate of the national welfare losses with and without 
restrictions. These two figures will be directly compared in order 
that the relative importance of regulating bank entry in contributing 
to total welfare losses for the country can be isolated.
SCOPE AND OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
As noted earlier, the purpose of this dissertation is to analyze 
the effects of entry and branching requirements on competitive con­
ditions in the commercial banking industry. The dissertation is 
concerned with how, by altering the market structure of banking, 
official agencies have affected social welfare by affecting the way 
in which banks might set prices to customers.
‘■The dissertation will measure these losses under the assumption 
that branching laws would have remained the same in the absence of 
regulation as with its existence.
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Three related areas of Interest have been Ignored in this dis­
sertation, however. First our concern is how prices are a function 
of the degree of competition rather than any scale advantages large 
firms might enjoy vis-a-vis smaller firms. The dissertation will 
not investigate the possibility that commercial banking should be 
regulated as a natural monopoly, since the existing literature on 
bank costs shows conclusively that commercial banking is not charac- 
terized by constantly declining long-run average costs. The general 
consensus on this point is aptly stated by George Bentson:
The primary policy implication that may be drawn (from 
the studies on bank costs) is that the authorities 
need not be overly concerned about the existence of 
a natural monopoly in banks were they allowed to grow 
in size . . . the conclusion is that the banking 
authorities should have few fears that unrestricted 
competition would result in one or a few surviving 
banks.^
The fact that banking is not considered a natural monopoly is 
important to this dissertation because if it were, it would imply 
that restrictions on entry should be imposed in order that a few 
large banks could dominate the entire national banking market with 
an extensive nationwide branching structure while being regulated as
^The costs in question here are administrative costs, or operating 
costs that do not Include interest payments made to acquire deposit 
funds.
^George Bentson, "The Optimal Banking Structure: Theory and Evi­
dence," Journal of Bank Research, Vol. 3, (Winter, 1973), p. 225.
This article is also a very good survey of all the empirical research 
on bank costs.
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a public utility. A dissertation arguing for unrestricted entry of 
new banks Into the industry In order to Increase competition would 
then be Irrelevant.
Second, the dissertation will also Ignore the effect of bank 
holding companies on the level of competition. This omission is 
justifiable because the literature on bank holding companies is 
virtually unanimous in concluding that bank holding companies have 
no appreciable effect on bank performance.^
Third, monopoly power in the deposit market will not be 
separately studied. That is, the conclusions reached will be based 
on an investigation of the ramifications of entry restrictions and 
branching regulations on the monopoly power of banks in the loan 
market only. However, since any bank is likely to exert a roughly 
similar amount of power in either market, conclusions reached In this 
dissertation could well be applicable to the deposit market as well.
^For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see William 
Jackson, Multibank Holding Companies and Bank Behavior, (Richmond,
Va.: Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 1975); Robert'J . Lawrence,
The Performance of Bank Holding Companies (Washington, D.C., Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1967); Samuel H. Talley, 
The Effect of Holding Company Acquisitions on Bank Performance, Staff 
Economic Study No. 69, (Washington, D.C., Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 1971); Stuart Hoffman, "A Florida Case Study: 
Performance of Holding Company Banks," Monthly Review, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta, Vol. 60, December, 1975, pp. 202-205; David D. White­
head and B. Frank King, "Multibank Holding Companies and Local Market 
Concentration," Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Vol. 
61, April, 1976, pp. 34-43; Joseph W. McLeary, "Bank Holding Companies: 
Their Growth and Performance," Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Atlanta, Vol. 53, October, 1968, pp. 131-138.
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In order to evaluate the two hypotheses, the dissertation Is 
divided Into six chapters. Chapter II will examine how the official 
policies of the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency and the various state 
banking commissions have affected the market structure of commercial 
banking in this country. Since official regulations on bank entry 
and branching have altered the structure of commercial banking, it 
is important to know if this alteration has affected bank performance. 
Consequently, Chapter III will review the literature on market struc­
ture and performance in commercial banking. Two broad types of studies 
exist. The first type investigates the impact of market structure 
while either ignoring differences in branching laws across the sample 
or by studying banks in only one state or in states with similar 
branching laws. The second type investigates the impact of different 
branching laws on bank performance. It is important to note that the 
performance variables used in these previous studies differ from the 
variable that will be used in this study as an indicator of bank per­
formance. Therefore, a description of these earlier studies merely 
provides the reader with a review of the literature upon which the 
dissertation will build.
Chapter IV will develop a theory of the banking firm which will 
introduce a refined measure of the elasticity of loan demand as an 
indicator of bank performance. Furthermore, it will be argued that, 
if the welfare implications from the regulation of bank entry and 
branching are to be analyzed, then this variable is superior to the 
traditional variables, used in the studies cited in Chapter III.
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Chapter V will be the empirical chapter that will test the two 
hypotheses. Furthermore, if the first hypothesis that restrictions 
on new bank entry have served to reduce social welfare is accepted, 
the impact of these welfare losses over the years 1968-1974 will 
then be estimated. Of the total welfare loss to society from com­
mercial banking's less than perfectly competitive position, an 
estimate will be made of the proportion of these losses that can 
actually be attributed to regulation as opposed to market imperfec­
tions. No significance will be placed on the absolute monetary value 
of these welfare losses. All that is sought is a relative comparison 
of the officially-induced welfare losses to the naturally-induced 
losses. Chapter VI will then present the summary and conclusions 
of the dissertation and its Implications for official policy.
CHAPTER II
THE IMPACT OF OFFICIAL RESTRICTIONS ON ENTRY AND BRANCHING 
ON THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF COMMERCIAL BANKING
The purpose of this chapter is first, to describe official 
restrictions on bank entry and branching, and secondly, to determine 
if these restrictions have had any impact on the market structure of 
commercial banking. If these restrictions have affected market struc­
ture then one can surmise that they may have influenced the level of 
competition in commercial banking. If this is the case, then it 
follows that banks will alter their price and output decisions, thus 
affecting social welfare. The impact of these officially-induced 
changes in the market structure of commercial banking on bank perfor­
mance will be measured in a later chapter.
RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BANK ENTRY AND MARKET STRUCTURE 
The Background
Bank chartering in this country can be classified as a dual sys­
tem. A prospective new bank may apply for either a national or a 
state charter.^ This separation of chartering powers has been in
*A national bank charter is granted by the U.S. Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency. This agency must also approve all new 
branches or mergers in which the surviving bank holds a national 
charter. It also acts on all applications of state-chartered banks
15
16
existence for virtually as long as the United States has been a 
nation. The first banks chartered in this country received a state 
charter in 1782, and in 1791 federal regulation began with the 
establishment of the First Bank of the United States. With the 
demise of the Second Bank of the United States in 1836, however, 
the federal government withdrew from any aspect of bank chartering, 
leaving it entirely to the states. In 1863, though, Congress insti­
tuted the National Banking System, and since that time the dual system 
of chartering has continued.
Throughout most of the nineteenth and early twentieth century 
there existed what was called "free banking," which means that poten­
tial bank owners only had to meet minimum capital requirements in 
order to establish a bank. However, from 1929 to 1933, 9,965 banks
became defunct. This was over one-fourth of all commercial banks in
2existence at the beginning of 1929.
The wave of bank failures during the Great Depression was felt 
to be mainly the result of the unrestricted entry of new banks into 
the industry during the pre-Depression era. Unrestricted entry was 
believed to have caused "excessive competition" in banking by
to become nationally-chartered. Approvals for state bank charters, 
branches, and mergers must come from the respective state banking 
commissions.
^Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System, All-Bank 
Statistics. United States. 1896-1955» (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1959), p. 33, Table A-l.
%.S. Comptroller of the Currency, Annual Report, 1937. p. 14.
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creating too many banks than was actually needed to satisfy the 
public's demand for credit. The "over-banked" situation Is supposed 
to have resulted in a rise In the failure rate of banks because of 
an over-extension of unsound credit due to lack of adequate markets 
for bank credit.^
Competition has usually been thought of as the dynamic process 
by which inefficient businesses are eliminated by failure. With 
several exceptions such as public utilities, a natural monopoly, and 
commercial banks, the price of business failure is not regarded as too 
high for society to pay. The situation with commercial banking is 
different. A bank failure, it is believed, is a community disaster, 
however, wherever, and whenever it occurs. While competition may be 
desirable up to a point in banking, there is a clear limit, so the 
theory goes, to its desirability.
For these reasons both federal and state chartering officials 
felt that new bank entry must be restricted. This attitude is clearly 
expressed in the 1960 Annual Report of the FDIC.
With the experience of thousands and thousands of bank 
failures between 1920 and 1934, attributed in many 
instances to weak or under-capitalized banks in popu­
lation centers unable to support them, bank chartering 
authorities were alert to prevent a repetition of the 
overbanked situation of the early 1920's. While it 
may to some persons now seem a desirable situation to 
have, as in 1921, more than 30,000 banks with open doors
^Economic Policy Commission, American Bankers Association, The 
Bank Chartering History and Policies of the United States, (New York: 
1935), p. 47.
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for borrowers and depositors throughout the United 
States, bank supervisors and chartering authorities 
of the 1930's and 1940's knew that many of these banks 
closed their doors with great losses and hardships to 
their depositors and were determined this would not 
happen again.5
This philosophy was incorporated into the National Banking Act of 
1935 and associated state banking laws around the same time. No 
longer was the satisfaction of minimum capital requirements the sole 
requirement for new bank formation. The National Banking Act of 1935 
now required that for the chartering of a new national bank, the 
Comptroller of the Currency must consider " . . .  the adequacy of its 
capital structure, its future earnings prospects, the general charac­
ter of its management, and the convenience and needs of the community 
to be served by the bank."®
State laws exist which also restrict new bank entry. Indiana 
law, for instance, requires that a prospective bank receive approval 
by the State Department of Financial Institutions "at Its discretion. 
Mississippi law requires that state chartering officials, when consid­
ering a charter for a new bank, look at the "record of earnings and
^Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual Report, I960, 
p. 36.
®Fublic Law 305, 74th Congress, 1st Session, Section 12B, Federal 
Reserve Act, sub-section (g), 49 Stat. 684, 688; as cited in David 
Motter, "Bank Formation and the Public Interest," National Banking 
Review, Vol. 2, (March, 1965), p. 234.
^"Selected Bank Regulations in Eighth District States," Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Monthly Review, Vol. 56, (July, 1974), 
p. 20, Table A-II.
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condition of existing banks and the effects of a new bank upon them."8 
Missouri law requires that chartering officials consider the "probable 
volume of business in the locality sufficient to maintain solvency of 
the new bank and existing banks, without endangering the safety of any 
bank.9 State chartering officials in Tennessee are required to con­
sider the "need in the community for a new bank, considering the 
adequacy of existing banks.
The Effect on Market Structure
The philosophy that resulted in these new regulations has had a 
definite impact on the market structure of commercial banking.
Increased restrictions on entry have served to keep the number of new 
banks at a lower level that otherwise would have been the case. This 
is clearly seen in Table II-A, which shows the approval and rejection 
rate for national bank charters for the period 1939-1974. While sta­
tistics on new bank charters granted by state banking commissions are 
published, no data exist which shows the record of the number of rejec­
tions made by state banking authorities. Thus, the actual chartering 
policy of these agencies cannot be explicitly tabulated. However, it 
is a safe assumption that state authorities generally follow the 
policies of the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency in not allowing the 
free entry of banks. Were they to allow free entry, it is unlikely
8Ibid., p. 20, Table A-II.
9Ibid., p. 20, Table A-II.
10Ibld., p. 20, Table A-II.
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that any bank would risk rejection of its application by even apply­
ing for a national charter. The fact that prospective banks apply 
for national bank charters in the face of evidence that a rejection 
is certainly likely is proof that state banking commissions have 
followed restrictive policies as well.
The pattern that appears to emerge from the data of Table Il-A 
is that chartering policy was especially restrictive immediately 
after World War II and remained so until 1962. At that time James 
Saxon became Comptroller of the Currency, bringing with him a more 
liberal attitude on bank chartering. For two years, in 1962 and 
1963, national bank chartering, in terms of the number of banks 
chartered as well as the ratio of charters to rejections, reached 
a new high in the post-Depression era. This liberal policy tapered 
off in 1964, which may account for the lower number of charter 
applications in the few years shortly thereafter. Bank chartering 
was liberalized again, however, in the years 1968 and 1969 under 
the direction of a new Comptroller, William B. Camp. The early 
1970's have seen a return to a more restrictive policy under Comp­
troller James Smith. It is worth noting, however, that although 
rejection rates have been higher since 1969 than for the 1962-1969 
period, the number of actual banks chartered has remained fairly high, 
certainly above the period before 1962. If one were to use the number 
of banks approved for charters as an indicator of chartering policy, 




Applications and Approvals For
National Bank. Charters, 1939-1974
Year Received3 Approved Rejected Abandoned
Pending at 
the end of the year
1939 53 21 5 8 19
1940 56 28 5 5 18
1941 37 11 6 12 8
1942 23 12 2 5 4
1943 26 13 6 3 4
1944 80 41 12 4 23
1945 61 16 16 3 26
1946 97 43. 21 17 26
1947 75 25 20 12 18
1948 66 22 17 4 23
1949 61 16 16 13 16
1950 51 13 19 6 .13
1951 46 17 6 0 23
1952 66 16 16 7 27
1953 77 24 18 6 29
1954 97 34 15 0 48
1955 71 38 23 2 8
1956 59 23 20 11 5
1957 48 12 13 7 16
1958 48 18 11 7 12
1959 79 21 17 8 33
1960 62 17 22 1 22
1961 89 24 25 11 19
1962 176 132 17 23 4
1963 549 258 175 46 70
1964 538 185 242 30 81
1965 188 27 120 16 25
1966 35 23 6 2 4
1967 18 14 2 0 2
1968 54 42 0 1 11
1969 55 54 0 0 1
1970 159 42 46 9 62
1971 185 55 54 5 171
1972 280 84 60 10 126
1973 357 134 68 4 151
1974 313 92 70 10 141
Source: U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, Annual Reports, 1939-1974.
Applications received include those pending at the end of the 
previous year plus applications for conversion rrom state to national 
bank charters.
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State chartering officials have also followed a more liberal 
chartering policy since 1962. Table II-B shows this tendency. Since 
figures for approvals and rejections of applications for state banking 
charters are not published, the policies of state banking commissions 
are shown by considering the number of new state banks beginning 
operations each year. It is evident that state chartering officials 
generally follow the same policies as the Comptroller of the Currency. 
This similarity can be seen if one compares the number of state banks 
beginning operations each year to the number of approvals for national 
bank charters in the same year. In other words, when one considers 
the market for both national and state bank charters, the entire 
period from 1962-1974 has been one of more liberal chartering policies.
As stated previously, the official policy on bank chartering is 
that since a bank failure is a community disaster, what is lost in the 
number of competitors is balanced by a reduction in bank insolvencies. 
If this is the case then one would expect to see some kind of relation­
ship between increased rates of bank formation and increases in bank 
failures. However, as shown in Table II-C, a look at the actual number 
of bank failures in the 1950-1961 era relative to the number of bank 
failures in the period 1962-1974 does not confirm this contention.
Since the number of bank failures in any one year is more likely 
related to bank openings in previous years, the failure ratio used in 
Table II-C shows the number of failures in any given year divided by 
the average number of new bank openings, including both national and 
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rate for 1950, .053, was derived by-dividing the number of bank 
failures in 1950, 5, by the average number of bank openings from 
1946-1950, 94.
Obviously there are other things that could affect bank failures 
in any year. In particular the state of the economy can be expected 
to exert a strong influence. However, both periods, 1950-1961, and 
1962-1974, contained both weak and strong economic periods, so that 
the effect of the economy on bank failures should be fairly neutral 
when comparing the two periods.
What is evident from Table II-C is that more liberal chartering 
does not necessarily lead to an increase in failure rates. In fact, 
the average annual failure rate in the period 1950-1961 was .059, 
which was higher than .035, the average annual failure rate in the 
period 1962-1974.
Of course, Table II-C is hardly a rigorous proof of the argument 
that more liberal chartering does not necessarily lead to increased 
bank failures, but it is at least suggestive of that conclusion. In 
actuality, changes in chartering policies by themselves probably have 
only a minimal effect on the failure rate of banks. Rather, general 
economic conditions are probably the primary determinant of the rate 
of bank failures. So many banks failed during the Great Depression, 
because of the Depression Itself and not due to the pre-Depression 
chartering policies. Similarly, failure rates have been relatively low 
over the past twenty-five years not because chartering policies have
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Table II-C
New Bank Openings and Failures, 
1950-1974*
Failures/Average Number






1950 67 5 .053
1951 60 5 .064
1952 67 4 .059
1953 64 5 .075
1954 72 4 .060
1955 116 5 .063
1956 119 3 .034
1957 84 3 .033
1958 92 9 .094
1959 114 3 .029
1960 125 2 .019
1961 108 9 .085
1962 179 3 .025
1963 300 2 .011
1964 335 8 .039
1965 195 9 .041
1966 121 8 .036
1967 107 4 .019
1968 86 3 .016
1969 134 9 .072
1970 185 8 .080
1971 203 6 .042
1972 246 1 .005
1973 340 6 .018
1974 394 4 .016
Source; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual Reports, 
1945-1974.
^hese data are the sum of national and state bank openings for 
each year. Some discrepancies will exist between these data and the 
sum of figures for Tables II-A and II-B because the data in Table II-A 
are approvals for national bank charters in any year, and an approval 
for a bank charter does not necessarily mean the bank will actually 
begin operations that same year.
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been restrictive to some degree, but because economic conditions have 
been generally good.
The fact that more liberal chartering does not appear to have any 
relationship to a rise in bank failures should not be surprising.
Many of the bank failures during the 1930fs could have been prevented 
had deposits been insured. As it was, the threat of bank insolvency 
was enough to warrant a run on banks by depositors. This possibility 
is virtually eliminated today by the deposit insurance offered by the 
FDIC. Even if bank failures had shown a significant increase over the 
period 1962-1974, which they did not, it is unlikely that depositors 
would have panicked.
Establishing that restrictive chartering does indeed exist and 
that it lowers the number of banks that otherwise would exist does not 
answer the question of by how much have new bank formations been 
reduced. In a 1966 study, Samuel Peltzman tried to empirically esti­
mate the effect of the Banking Act of 1935 on the formation of new 
banks.-*-*- He assumed that new bank formation was related to several 
key economic variables, taken from the period 1921-1962. In order to 
compare both regulation and non-regulation eras, Peltzman computed the 
number of new banks that were actually formed during the regulation era 
and compared this figure with the number of new banks that would have 
been formed in the absence of regulation as predicted by his model.
^Samuel Peltzman, "Bank Entry Regulation: Its Impact and Pur­
pose ," in Studies in Banking Competition and the Banking Structure, 
Administrator of National Banks (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1967), pp. 285-289.
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The difference, of course, is the effect of regulation on new bank 
entry. Peltzman's basic model is shown below.
e = a + B- In tt,. , + B_ In D + B, In C + B. y t i l  t-1 2 t 3 t ^ t
+ Bc C^) + m + x + B,R + u5 S t t t 6 t t
where,
et = the number of new commercial banks formed in year t, as a per
cent of the number of banks existing in year t
= the expected rate of return on capital in banking in year t
(the ratio of market to book value for banks in year t-1 times
the average yield in year t-1 on Moody's Aaa bonds.)
Dfc » total deposits, net of cash assets, in year t
= total capital invested in banking in year t
ht = risk of capital loss in year t
(AJL) = intended percentage change in capital size per bank in year t 
S t
m t = the number of banks merging in year t, as a per cent of the 
number of existing banks in year t 
xt = the number of banks failing and liquidating, net of reopenings, 
in year t, as a per cent of existing banks in year t 
Rt = the effects of regulation: when year t is prior to 1936
Rt = 0; when year t is 1936 and after Rt a 1 
ufc = a random error term.
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Peltzman asserted that the risk of capital loss Is related to
the current rate of failure and intended size change is related to the
merger rate. These relationships are expressed in linear form:
(11) “ o2 + B?xt
<12> <f>t - «3 + Vt
The logic behind the second function is as follows. Suppose there is 
an increase in the size at which a bank's per unit costs become con­
stant. This will cause some previously efficient banks to become 
inefficient. Such firms will want to grow more rapidly than the 
average to attain the new minimum efficient size, or they will wish 
to leave the industry. Either action will lead to an increase in 
the average size of banks. The same is true for entrants. An exten­
sion of scale economies will discourage those firms which had intended 
to enter at the previous minimum efficient size from doing so. They 
will increase their entering capital or drop out. The net result 
will be fewer and larger banks. One important way in which some firms 
can grow faster than the average is by acquiring other firms. Simi­
larly, one way in which a firm may leave the industry is by selling 
out to another firm. Therefore, any increase in scale economies 
should be reflected in an increased merger among existing banks.
Since the extension of scale economies will cause the intended size 
of firms to increase, the merger rate should be a good proxy for the 
Intended rate of change of firm size. Substituting equations (11) and
(12) into Peltzman's basic model we get
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et " al + B1 ln ^t-l + B2 '*,n Dt + B3 ln ct + B4^a2 + B7 xt^
+ Bg(ag + Bg mt) + ij. + xt + Bg Rt +
or,
et " ̂al + a2B4 +  a3B5^ + Bi ln "t-l + B2 ln Dt + B3 ln Ct
+ (1 + B4 By) xt + (1 + B5 Bg) mt + B6 Rt + u£
Peltzman predicted the following expected signs for each coefficient, 
although there was no discussion in his study of why they should,
a priori, turn out as expected: B^ > 0, > 0, Bg < 0, (1 +  B4 By)
* 0, (1 + B- B ) < 0, and B6 < 0.J 8
Although the theoretical model is expressed in natural logarithms 
Peltzman converted from natural logarithms to common logarithms in 
testing his model. Using ordinary least squares analysis and aggre­
gate annual data for the U.S. from 1921-1962, Peltzman arrived at the
12following equation. Standard errors for the coefficients are listed 
in parentheses below each coefficient. The Durbin-Watson statistic
e = .234 + 1.868 log i - .047 x - .231 mt + .619 log Dt 
C (.241) (.017) C (.064) (.267)
-1.097 log C. - .579 IL 
(.487) (.117)
R2 - .871
^2The year 1933 was omitted from the study because Peltzman’s 
source for new bank openings (Banking and Monetary Statistics, Federal 
Reserve Board, 1956) did not distinguish in that year new openings 
from reopenings of suspended banks.
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was unreported, but Peltzman stated that It was In the Indeterminate 
range, I.e., the test was Inconclusive concerning the hypothesis 
that autocorrelation was present.
The important variable in the model, of course, is Rt, the 
effect of regulation on new bank entry. As computed by Peltzman,
Bg is the average percentage point reduction in the annual entry 
rate due to regulation. In general, as a national average, restric­
tions on new bank entry have caused the annual rate of entry to drop 
by 0.579 percentage points per year. Since the actual rate of entry 
over this time period was 0.605 per cent per annum, this meant almost 
a 50 per cent drop in the rate of new bank entry.
Adding the 0.579 figure to the actual entry rates for each year 
since 1935, Peltzman computed that restrictions on new bank entry 
had prevented 2,196 banks from being formed during the years 1936 to 
1962. However, he did note that some of these banks would have sub­
sequently failed or merged with other banks. The 2,196 figure is 
thus a gross number of new bank formations. To get a net figure he 
multiplied the gross figure by .308, the number of failures and 
mergers from 1936-1972 divided by the average number of banks for 
the same period. This figure, 677, represented the number of the 
additional banks formed in the absence of regulation that would have 
failed or merged with other banks. Thus, the net number of additional 
bank formations was estimated as 1,519.
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Peltzman*s model extended only through 1962, the year of the 
advent of more liberal chartering policies. Because of this, the 
coefficient for the regulatory dummy variable ln the years 1962- 
1974 may be lower ln value than existed in the pre-1962 era. In 
order to determine the number of banks that would have existed in 
1974 in the absence of regulation it is necessary that Peltzman*s 
model be amended to take into consideration any change in policy 
during the period 1962-1974.^
To determine the change, if any, ln chartering policy since 1962, 
a new model was developed. Peltzman's model was generally followed, 
except that the expected profits variable in year t, defined as Pt_^ 
in the new model, was restated to be the actual profit rate that 
existed in commercial banking in year t-1; and a second dummy variable 
was introduced to estimate the influence of regulation in the period 
1962-1974. Other than these changes, the variables were the same as 
in the Peltzman study. The years 1963-1974 were added to those used 
in the Peltzman study, but whereas the year 1933 was eliminated from 
his study, the years 1933-1933 were not included ln the new model. 
During those years, the expected profits variable was negative, as 
banks actually lost money. This negative value prevented the use of 
logarithms for this variable ln the model. Therefore, the updated 
study covered the period, 1921-1974, omitting 1933-1935.
■L̂ The updating of the Peltzman model will be even more important 
in Chapter V, when the hypothetical number of banks that would exist 
in the absence of restrictions on entry becomes crucial to the compu­
tation of welfare losses due to those restrictions.
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The specifie.ition of the new model is
Et = “o + “lPt-l + a2 \  + B3xt + V t  + B5Ct 
+ b^  + b?r2 + u
and R£ are defined as
R^ = 0 for the years 1921-1932; 1 for the years 1936-1974
R^ = 0 for the years 1921-1932 and 1936-1961; 1 for the years 1962-1974
In this new model the coefficient for indicates the reduction 
in the annual rate of entry of new banks for the entire period of the 
study, 1936-1974. The coefficient of signifies any change in the 
coefficient for R^ that occurs during 1962-1974. If chartering policy 
has indeed been more liberal since 1962, then should be positive. 
This would indicate a reduction in the effect of regulation on entry, 
since Bg should assume a negative value.
Seven different equations, depending on how the independent 
variables were specified, were estimated in an attempt to obtain the 
best model. These equations are listed in the appendix at the end of 
the chapter.
In order to find a model that would explain as much of the depen­
dent variable, Et, as possible, the independent variables were, in 
some equations, expressed in logarithmic form.^ In addition, in 
five of the equations, Dt and Ct were expressed in changes rather than
^To parallel Peltzman's model as closely as possible, common 
logarithms were used rather than natural logarithms.
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in absolute amounts. None of the equations provided a Durbin-Watson
statistic that could lead one to conclude, at the .05 level of
significance, that autocorrelation among the residuals did 
not exist. In fact, only Equation 1 had a Durbin-Watson statistic
in the indeterminate range. The other six equations had Durbin- 
Watson statistics that led one to conclude that autocorrelation did
exist among the residuals. For this reason Equation 1 
was selected. The equation is stated below with the t-statistics 
listed in parentheses.*'’
E = -0.824 + 0.587 log p.. , - 0.687 log m - 0.271 log x 
(-0.48) (2.43)* (-1.80) (-1.53)
-1.724 log Dt + 2.548 log Cfc - 1.373 R-, + 0.599 R2 
(-2.04)* (2.76)* (-5.05)* (2.65)*
R2 - .714
D.W. statistic = 1.34
According to the equation, the regulation of new bank entry has
indeed served to lower the rate of additional bank formation. This is
indicated by the negative coefficient for R̂ . Furthermore, these entry
Although the same basic model as Peltzmanfs was used, except 
for the specification of the expected profits variable and the intro­
duction of a second dummy variable, two of the variables in this model,
Dt and Ct, had different signs for their coefficients, even though both 
variables were statistically significant in both models. Perhaps this 
was due to some structural changes in the economy during the period 
1962-1974. The reason for this contradiction, though, is not important 
for purposes of this dissertation. What is important is that the 
coefficient of both dummy variables in the updated model are significant, 
and in the predicted direction.
restrictions have been less severe since 1962, as indicated by the 
positive coefficient for R̂ . Specifically, the coefficient for R^ 
means that due to official restrictions on new bank entry, the rate 
of new bank formation was lowered by 1.373 percentage points per 
year during the period 1936-1961. The coefficient for R2 means 
during the more liberal chartering period of 1962-1974, the rate of 
new bank formation was only reduced by (1.373 - 0.599) = 0.774 per­
centage points per year because of official restrictions on entry. 
Using these figures, then, it is possible to estimate the number of 
banks that would have existed at the end of 1974 in the absence of 
restrictive chartering. The average number of banks in 1936 was 
15»265 and the actual entry rate of new banks, as a percentage of the 
average number of banks, was 0.38 per cent. This meant that 59 new 
banks were actually formed during 1936. Using the coefficient of R̂ » 
the entry rate in the absence of regulation would have been 0.38 + 
1.373 = 1.753 per cent. This means that in the absence of regulation 
the number of new banks formed would have been 268. In 1937 the 
actual rate of entry was 0.40 per cent, so that in the absence of 
regulation the rate of entry would have been 0.40 + 1.373 = 1.773 per 
cent. Multiplying this times the average number of banks for 1937, 
15,016.5, results in a hypothetical number of new bank formations 
of 266, instead of the 62 that actually took place. This procedure 
is followed for every year, except that for the years 1962-1974, the 
actual entry rate is increased by 0.774.
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Using this method it was determined that the amount of additional 
new banks that would have been formed in the absence of restrictions 
on new bank entry would have been 6,727. Of course, one would not 
expect that all of these banks would have survived as independent 
banks. Some would have undoubtedly failed or merged with other banks. 
As noted earlier, Peltzman took this into account by subtracting from 
additional gross formations an estimate of the number of these banks 
that would have failed or m e r g e d . T h e  same procedure was used here. 
The average number of banks ln any given year from 1936 to 1974 was 
14,619. The total number of failures and mergers during this time 
was 6,025, or 41.2 per cent of the average. Following Peltzman, one 
can then estimate that 41.2 per cent of these additional bank openings, 
or 2,772 banks, would have failed or merged with other banks. This 
leaves a net total of additional bank formations in the absence of 
regulation of 3,955.^ The number of independent banks in existence, 
then, at the end of 1974, can be estimated to be 19,321. This is a 
32 per cent increase over the 14,670 banks actually existing at that 
time.
^ S e e  page 30.
^ One could criticize this method by stating that with the addi­
tional bank formations the failure rate would have increased; however, 
Table II-C on page 25 showed the failure rates displayed no apparent 
trend with the amount of new bank openings.
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RESTRICTIONS ON BRANCHING AND MARKET STRUCTURE
Restrictions on new bank entry are not the only way that regula­
tory officials can affect the market structure of commercial banking. 
Even if the Banking Act of 1935 had not been passed, state banking 
officials would still have altered the structure of commercial banking 
by imposing restrictions on the extent to which existing banks can 
establish branches. The rationale for branching restrictions dates 
back to the demise of the Second Bank of the United States.^ The 
closing of the Second Bank was attributed largely to rivalries between 
states and regions. Western states were fearful that eastern interests 
would control the Bank and that funds would flow to large financial 
centers in the East. Prohibition of branching across state lines, it 
was assumed, would keep control of financial resources of the state in 
local hands, and would speed up development. Branching restrictions 
within states were motivated by many of the same reasons.
Regulations on branching are imposed by the various state banking 
commissions, or by existing state laws. These regulations are enforced 
on all banks within the state regardless of the origin of the bank's 
charter. Branching laws within states may take one of three different 
forms. A classification of states by branching law is shown in Table 
II-D. Unit-banking states allow no branching whatsoever or limit it 
to one or two limited-service facilities within close proximity to the
18Donald Jacobs, "The Framework of Commercial Bank Regulation:
An Appraisal," in Studies in Banking Competition and the Banking 
Structure, op. cit.. p. 347.
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Table II-D










Nebraska New Hampshire Maryland
North Dakota New Jersey3»b Nevada
Oklahoma New Mexico^ North Carolina
Texas New Yorkb Oregon
West Virginia Ohio Rhode Island






aChanged their branching laws ln 1973; since this study encom­
passes the years 1968-1974* these states will be classified by the 
laws prevailing before 1973.
bAllow lnter-county branching either Into adjoining counties 
or within a 100-mile radius of the bank's main office.
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main office. For example, Che state of Illinois allows no bank to 
establish full-service branches, i.e., those offices that can both 
accept deposits and grant loans. Instead, it allows a bank to 
establish a limlted-service branch, one that may accept only deposits, 
and then "not more than 1500 feet from the home office and generally 
more than 600 feet from another bank's premise.
Limited-branching states allow some form of branching within the 
county in which the home office resides or allow inter-county branch­
ing, usually into adjoining counties only, or within a 100-mile radius 
of the home office. Kentucky, for instance, allows a bank to establish 
full-service branches wiuhln the county in which the home office 
resides as long as the branch is not to be established in the home town 
of another bank or within one mile of any other bank's branch.
Tennessee imposes no restrictions on county-wide branching. Mississippi 
law stipulates that a bank may establish a maximum of fifteen branches 
anywhere within a 100-mile radius from the home office, but not in any 
city or town with a population of less than 3,100 and one or more 
existing bank offices.2® Statewide-branching states usually allow 
unlimited branching of full-service offices within the boundaries of 
the state in which the home office resides. However, one state,
■^"Selected Bank Regulations in Eighth-District States," op.cit., 
p. 22, Table A-IV.
20Ibid., p. 22, Table A-IV.
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Virginia, allows a bank to establish branches anywhere within state 
boundaries only if the branch is acquired through the merger with 
another bank.^
The one noticeable diffefence in the commerical banking structure 
among the various states is that population per bank increases, while 
population per bank office decreases, the more liberal are branching 
laws. This is shown in Table II-E, which shows figures as of June 
30, 1972. Two population per bank variables are listed. One is 
simply the total population of each state divided by the number of 
banks in each state. This variable is the one listed by the FD1C in 
its annual reports. However, it is not representative of the actual 
number of competitors faced by a given Individual bank since the entire 
state is not an accurate approximation of the market for loans for any 
one bank. As noted in the legal decision concerning the U.S. vs. 
Philadelphia National Bank case,
For the vast majority of banks and bank borrowers and 
depositors, banking business is principally local in 
nature. The factor of inconvenience localizes banking 
competition as effectively as high transportation costs 
in other Industries.22
21Bruce Sumner, "Regulations Affecting Competition Between Banks 
and Thrift Institutions in the Fifth District," Economic Review, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Vol. 62, (May/June, 1976), p. 17.
^U.S. vs. Philadelphia National Bank et. al., 374 U.S. 321 at
358 (1963), as quoted in Bernard Shull and Paul Horvitz, "Branch 
Banking and the Structure of Competition," in Studies in Banking
Competition and the Banking Structure, op. cit., p. 351.
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A better indicator of the actual degree of competition would be 
to divide the population of the state by the number of independent 
banks in each county, summing over all counties in the state. For 
unit-banking states, and limited-branching states that prohibit 
branching across counties, this population per bank variable would 
be identical to the one described above. Mathematically, for these 
states,
where is the population of the t*1*1 state, is the number of banks 
in that state, and b^j is the number of banks in county of the i*1*1 
state, where there are n counties. For those states that allow state­
wide branching or allow some form of inter-county branching, the two 
population per bank variables would not be identical. This is because 
an individual bank can branch into more than one county, so that the 
same bank can be counted more than once when the number of banks is 
being summed over all the counties in the states.
It should not be surprising that population per bank Increases 
while population per bank office decreases as branching laws become 
more liberal. A new office in a unit-banking state can be established 
only by the chartering of a new bank, while in limited-branching states 
existing b anks within the permitted area of branching can supply the 
additional bank services. In statewide-branching states any bank 
within the state can provide these services. Therefore, one should
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Table II-E
Population Per Bank and Population Per Bank Office 
By States, Grouped According to Branching Laws, As Of
June 30, 19'/2
Unit-Banking States
State Pop/Bank-la Pop/Bank-2^ Pop/Bank Office0
Arkansas 7,818 7,818 4,305
Colorado 9,135 9,135 7,435
Florida 16,024 16,024 11,880
Illinois 10,435 10,435 8,803
Iowa 4,097 4,097 2,885
Kansas 3,711 3,711 3,320
Minnesota 5,180 5,180 4,954
Missouri 6,900 6,900 6,078
Montana 5,576 5,576 4,522
Nebraska 3,312 3,312 3,093
North Dakota 4,042 4,042 2,622
Oklahoma 5,985 5,985 5,065
Texas 9,475 9,475 8,825
West Va. 10,222 10,222 8,645
Wyoming 6,001 6,001 4,726
Average 7,179 7,179 5,839
aDefined as the population of the state divided by the number of 
- banks in that state
^Defined as the population of the state divided by the number of 
banks in each county in that state summed over all counties





State Pop/Bank-1 Pop/Bank-2 Pop/Bank 0:
Alabama 12,857 12,857 5,949
Georgia 10,875 10,875 5,327
Indiana 12,968 12,968 4,805
Kentucky 9,618 9,618 4,588
Louisiana 15,630 15,630 5,577
Massachusetts 37,335 37,335 6,078
Michigan 27,335 20,546 5,609
Mississippi 12,434 9,342 3,977
New Hampshire 10,280 10,280 5,354
New Jersey 34,750 24,524 5,481
New Mexico 15,000 13,357 4,953
New York 60,216 32,801 6,281
Ohio 21,143 21,143 5,624
Pennsylvania 26,620 18,198 5,169
Tennessee 12,961 12,961 4,644
Wisconsin 7,371 6,665 4,944




State Pop/Bank-1 Pop/Bank-2 Pop/Bank Office
Alaska 32,500 6,792 4,166
Arizona 92,619 29,034 5,172
California 127,925 36,082 6,066
Connecticut 48,920 27,563 5,665
Delaware 29,736 21,078 4,556
Hawaii 73,545 34,957 5,219
Idaho 31,500 5,892 4,000
Maine 22,639 11,671 3,572
Maryland 36,540 20,013 5,861
Nevada 65,875 14,385 5,323
North Carolina 56,673 11,142 3,826
Oregon 46,425 13,752 5,296
Rhode Island 60,500 30,546 4,888
South Carolina 27,600 12,058 4,683
South Dakota 4,270 3,264 2,601
Utah 21,653 10,809 5,519
Vermont 11,000 6,934 3,447
Virginia 18,980 9,183 4,068
Washington 37,423 17,571 5,004
Average 44,529 18,541 4,680
Source: Population per bank office and Pop/Bank-1 are from the FDIC's 
Summary of Accounts and Deposits in All Commercial Banks. June 30. 
1972; Pop/Bank-2 was computed using the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits in 
All Commercial And Mutual Savings Banks. June 29. 1972.
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expect that population per bank increases as branching laws become 
more liberal because chartering officials, in order to satisfy the 
demand for more banking services, are less constrained in the avail­
able banks they can draw from.
The fact that population per bank office decreases as branching 
laws become more liberal can be answered in terms of differences in 
barriers to entry between the three types of branching systems.
Shull and Horvitz feel that regulatory barriers to new bank 
office entry are slighter the more liberal are branching laws. It 
is their contention that in states which allow branching, chartering 
officials are more likely to allow the establishment of a new bank 
office in the form of a branch of an existing bank than would be 
officials in unit-banking states where a new office can only be 
established by the opening of a new bank.^ The reason for this 
policy is that a branch bank of an existing bank will usually provide 
less competitive pressures on existing banks than a new bank would. 
Since a new branch is a part of an already existing organization, it 
would be less likely than a new Independent bank to take measures 
that would threaten to decrease its own organization's profits. 
Chartering officials will then not have to worry about imposing serious 
harm on existing banks. Furthermore, if a branch turns out to be 
unprofitable it can be closed with little Inconvenience to depositors.
^Bernard Shull and Paul Horvitz, "Branch Banking and the Struc­
ture of Competition," in Studies in Banking Competition and the Banking 
Structure, op. cit., pp. 136-137.
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Economics, as well as regulatory barriers, are usually stronger 
In unit-banking states than In states which allow branching.^ For 
one thing, some communities may be able to support a branch bank but 
not a unit bank. These communities sometimes have an unbalanced 
banking business. Wealthy surburban communities may generate a 
sizeable time deposit volume, but may have virtually no business loan 
demand. Other communities may be just the opposite. This imbalance 
between deposit and loan demand may be a deterrent to entry for an 
independent bank which must more or less balance the supply of funds 
with the demand. Furthermore, in order to properly spread its risks 
a unit bank must maintain some degree of balance in its loan portfolio. 
Certain communities may offer only particular loan markets, which 
could effectively deter new bank entry. These problems are largely 
overcome by the mobility of funds between offices of a branch system.
A lack of sufficient volume in certain areas is not as critical to a 
branch bank as to a unit bank since the branch bank is simply an 
office of a larger system whose overall portfolio is likely to be more 
diversified than that of any of its individual branches.
These barriers to entry are likely to be greater for limited- 
branching areas than statewide-branching areas. Since there are less 
banks per capita in statewide-branching states, chartering officials 
would be less concerned over the possible harm to existing banks that 
a new office would impose. Furthermore, economic barriers would tend
^David Alhadeff, "Barriers to Bank Entry," Southern Economic 
Journal, Vol. 40, (April, 1974), pp. 589-603.
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to be greater in limited areas, especially those which allow only 
county-wide branching, since in many cases an entire county may not 
offer a sufficient diversification of a loan portfolio and/or a 
sufficient matching of the demand and supply of funds to permit as 
many offices to exist as would be the case if any bank within the 
state was allowed to establish an office within the county.
CONCLUSION
Without question the actions of both national and state chartering 
authorities have served to alter the structure of the commercial bank­
ing industry by restricting the entrance of new banks and the 
establishment of branches of existing banks. But whether or not this 
alteration increases welfare losses to the public depends on the 
assumption that affecting market structure had a direct impact on 
bank performance. A review of the literature on the question of 
whether alterations in bank structure affect bank performance is the 
subject of the next chapter.
APPENDIX
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OF THE 
REGULATION MODEL OF CHAPTER Ila
Dependent
Variable Independent Variables R2 D.W.
1 . Et
-0.824 + 0.587 log Pt_^ - 0.687 log mt - 0.271 log xt 
(-0.48) (2.43)* (-1.80) (-1.53)
.714 1.34
-1.724 log Dt + 2.548 log C£ - 1.373 Rx + 0.599 R2 
(-2.04)* (2.76)* (-5.05)* (2.65)*
2. Et
-0.202 + 0.564 log p - 0.292 mt - 0.007 xfc 
(-1.61) (1.79)* (-1.84) (-0.12)
.713 1.21
-0.644 log Dfc + 1.646 log Ct - 1.192 R1 + 0.498 R2 




Variable Independent Variables R2 D.W.
3. Et
0.182 + 0.594 log Pt_^ - 0.384 log mt - 0.061 log xfc 
(0.34) (2.23)* (-0.96) (-0.39)
.686 1.08
+ 0.045 (Dt - D^ ) 2 + 0.096 (Ct - C^ ) 2 - 1.154 ^  + 0.806 R2 
(0.78) (1.57) (-4.17)* (4.83)*
4. Et
0.744 + 0.086 p - 0.281 mt - 0.001 x£ 
(1.92) (2.25)* (-1.85) (-0.01)
.754 1.21
-0.001 (Dt - D x) +0.001 (Ct - Ct_x) - 0.998 ^  + 0.311 R2 
(-1.77) (4.01)* (-4.55)* (1.39)
S. Et
0.905 + 0.441 log p - 0.378 log mt - 0.132 log xt 
(3.79)* (1.95)* (-1.13) (-1.08)
.744 1.10
-0.001 (Dfc - Dt l ) + 0.001 (Ct - Ct_1) - 1.125 Rx + 0.62 R2 




Variable Independent Variables R2 D.W.
6 . E
1.36 + 0.315 log p - 0.134 mt - 0.070 xt 
(4.28)*(1.22) (-0.96) (-1.17)
.768 1.22
-0.001 (Dt - Dfc_j) + 0.001 (Ct - C x) - 1.154 ^  + 0.603 Rj 
(1.75) (2.36)* (-6.25)* (3.80)*
7. Et
0.941 + 0.419 log Pt_^ - 0.260 log mt - 0.205 log xt 
(1.75) (1.88)* (-0.79) (-1.73)
Q 1.19
-0.001 (Dt - D x) + 0.001 (Ct - C x) - 1.11 Rx + 0.69 R2 
(-1.64) (2.96)* (-4.56)* (4.51)*
« iHy
t-statistics for each coefficient are in parentheses below the coefficient. An asterisk 
indicates that the coefficient is significant at the .05 level of significance.
Sources; 1921-1932 data are from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, All- 
Bank Statistics, United States, 1896-1955; 1936-1974 data are from various issues of the Federal 
Reserve Bulletin and the Annual Report of the FDIC.
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CHAPTER III
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
PERFORMANCE IN COMMERCIAL BANKING - THE EXISTING EVIDENCE
INTRODUCTION
Chapter II established that official policies on new bank entry 
and branching have altered the structure of commercial banking, both 
at the national and state level, by restricting new bank entry, and 
thus have served to keep the number of banks smaller than otherwise 
would have existed. Secondly, the commercial banking structure has 
been further altered by the particular branching law adopted by the 
individual states. Specifically, population per bank increases, 
while population per bank office decreases, as branching laws become 
more liberal.
The purpose of this chapter is to review past empirical research 
concerning the relationship between market structure and performance 
in commercial banking. As stated in the introductory chapter, the 
question to be investigated in this dissertation is whether the regu­
lation of commercial bank entry and branching, by affecting the market 
structure of banking, leads to poorer bank performance in the loan 
market, thus contributing to welfare losses to the public. Some light 
has been shed on this question by previous studies, though, as will be
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argued later in this and the following chapter, there are shortcomings 
to these studies which do not allow them to give a proper indication 
of actual welfare losses caused by regulatory action.
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section 
reviews those studies that consider the effect of increased concen­
tration in banking markets on bank performance without explicitly 
taking into account the effect of different branching laws on bank 
performance. This Is done by either studying bank behavior in one 
state or in those states with similar branching laws, or simply by 
studying a sample of banks drawn from all three types of branching 
areas and then attempting to take account statistically of the separate 
effects on bank performance of the different branching laws. The 
second section of the chapter will review the literature which exa­
mines whether branching laws per se have any differential effects on 
bank performance.
MARKET CONCENTRATION AND BANK PERFORMANCE
The earliest attempt to establish a statistical relationship 
between concentration in banking markets and loan rates charged by 
commercial banks was by Franklin Edwards.^ For his sample, Edwards
^Franklin R. Edwards, "Concentration in Banking and Its Effect 
on Business Loan Rates," Review of Economics and Statistics. Vol.
46, (August, 1964), pp. 294-300.
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selected forty-nine metropolitan areas across the country. As his 
dependent variable he used average effective rates on small business 
loans for each area as of October 5, 1955. It was his contention 
that for this particular bank product, the relevant market was the 
metropolitan area, as small firms were unlikely to seek loans from 
banks outside the metropolitan area in which they reside. Edwards 
regressed Interest rates on average loan size, the demand for business 
loans, population growth, and a measure of concentration (the per cent 
of total deposits held by the three largest banks in the metropolitan 
area. In addition he attempted to hold the effect of branching laws 
constant by introducing a dummy variable for any area that was located 
in a statewide branching state. For this sample Edwards found a small, 
yet statistically significant relationship between concentration levels 
and interest rates on small business loans. A ten per cent Increase in 
the concentration ratio caused, on the average, an increase of six basis 
points in loan rates. Since the average rate in the forty-nine areas 
at the time of the study was 4.94 per cent per annum, this would mean 
a rise to 5.00 per cent. Edwards failed to find any relationship 
between the type of branching law and interest rates. This, of course, 
indicates that for any given concentration ratio, banks in areas where
statewide branching exists do not perform any better, or worse, than
2those in unit or limited-branching areas.
^Edwards, though, could have Investigated the effects of branch­
ing on performance further by determining If concentration ratios 
differed significantly between unit, limited and statewide branching 
areas. In fact, figures for June 30, 1964, published by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, reveal that three-bank concentration
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In a second study, Edwards investigated the relationship between 
concentration and average rates on time deposits in the same forty- 
nine metropolitan areas for the year 1962. He found that rates on 
time deposits were significantly, and negatively, correlated with the 
two-bank concentration ratio in each area. Specifically, a ten per 
cent rise in the concentration ratio was found to cause a drop in the 
average rate on time deposits by seven basis points.^ Unlike his first 
study, Edwards failed to include any dummy variable for differences in 
branching laws among the metropolitan areas. For this reason his study 
contains a possible bias, if rates on time deposits are an explicit 
function of branching laws.
The findings of Edwards were confirmed in a study by Almarin 
Phillips.5 He used Information obtained from the Federal Reserve's 
"Quarterly Survey of Bank Rates on Short-Term Business Loans," for the 
years 1960, 1962, 1964, and 1966. Phillips estimated an equation for
ratios for SMSA's increase as branching laws become more liberal. The 
average concentration ratios for SMSA's in statewide branching areas 
was 82.9 per cent, while for SMSA's in limited-branching areas it was 
75.7 per cent, and for unit-banking SMSA's it was 68.9 per cent. This, 
of course, would indicate lower loan rates the more strict are branch­
ing laws. (Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Summary of
Accounts and Deposits in All Commercial Banks. June 30, 1964, pages 
15-17, Table J.
^Franklin R. Edwards, "The Banking Competition Controversey," in 
Studies in Banking Competition and the Banking Structure, op. cit., 
pp. 303-334.
4Ibid., p. 323.
’’Almarin Phillips, "Evidence on Concentration in Banking Markets 
and Interest Rates," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Vol. 53, (June, 1967),
pp. 916-926.
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each year, regressing effective rates on short-term business loans 
against several independent variables, including the three-bank 
concentration ratio for the metropolitan area in which each bank 
operated. Phillips also introduced a dummy variable to take account 
of the fact that larger banks make, on the average, larger loans than 
smaller banks, which ceteris paribus, command smaller rates than loans 
of lesser sizes. His results revealed that for all four years of the 
study, effective interest rates on short-term business loans were 
significantly and positively related to the three-bank concentration 
ratio. Depending on the year studied, a ten per cent rise in the 
concentration ratio caused a rise in interest rates of seven to ten 
basis points.
The main criticism with Phillips' study, is the same as that 
directed at Edwards' second study. Specifically, by not introducing 
a dummy variable to take account of differences in branching laws, 
his study omits the possibility that at any level of concentration, 
banks may charge different rates depending on the branching law under 
which they operate. As noted earlier, concentration increases the 
more liberal are branching laws; therefore one might conclude that 
Phillips' study is at least consistent with the view that banks in 
unit-banking areas charge the lowest rates on short-term business 
loans and banks in statewide-branching areas charge the highest.
The same criticism, that no explicit account was taken of the 
fact that branching laws differed among the metropolitan areas, would
apply to a study by F. W. Bell and Neil B. Murphy.** They attempted 
to discover whether concentration has any effect on service charges 
on demand deposits. This variable was chosen because, in their 
opinion, studies which used loan rates as the dependent variable 
suffered from the fact that the interest rate offered on any loan 
depends on the maturity of the loan, secured status, type of collateral, 
etc. Variations in interest rates could very well be the result of 
changes in these variables, and since these variables are extremely 
difficult to measure, a bias could be introduced into the study.
Using a concentration ratio that included the percentage of demand 
deposits held by the three largest banks in metropolitan areas they 
found a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
concentration and service charges on demand deposits.
In a recent study by H. Prescott Beighley and Alan S. McCall the 
bank market was defined as that for consumer Installment loans.^ It 
was their contention that this market is limited to local metropolitan 
areas because there is little searching by consumers for loans out­
side these limits. Also, there is little non-bank competition for 
installment loans of the type sought from commercial banks. Banks, 
consumer finance companies, credit unions, retailers, and sales
^F. W. Bell and Neil B. Murphy, "Impact of Market Structure on 
the Price of a Commercial Bank Service," Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol. 51, (May, 1969), pp. 210-213.
^H. Prescott Beighley and Alan S. McCall, "Market Power and 
Structure and Commercial Bank Installment Lending," Journal of Money. 
Credit, and Banking, Vol. 7, (November, 1975), pp. 449-467.
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finance companies perform somewhat different functions and often are 
not permitted to compete effectively with each other.
Beighley and McCall were the first to use the Lerner index as 
one of their measures of bank performance. The Lerner index is
g
defined as CP - MC)/P* The greater the disparity between price 
and marginal cost, i.e., the more monopolistic the firm, the larger 
is the value of this index. They also used other conventional per­
formance variables, such as profit rates per loan, and interest 
rates on loans, and attempted to discover whether the Lerner index 
was more directly related to market power than the conventional 
measures.
For their sample, Beighley and McCall studies 1968 data on 184 
metropolitan banks across the country. The concentration variables 
used was the Gini coefficient, which expresses the area between the 
Lorenz curve of strict equality and inequality of distribution of 
total bank assets in the metropolitan area as a percentage of the 
total area under the curve of equal distribution. Their empirical 
research revealed that there was a significant, and positive, rela­
tionship between the Lerner index for individual banks and the Gini 
coefficient for the metropolitan area in which the banks operated. 
Specifically, a ten per cent rise in the Gini coefficient caused, on 
the average, a 2% rise in the Lerner index. Furthermore, they found
QFor a discussion of how MC was estimated in their model, see 
Beighley and McCall, oj>. cit., pp. 451-453,
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a higher correlation between the Glnl coefficient and the Lerner 
Index than other performance variables.
Beighley and McCall did acknowledge that since concentration 
was greater where branch banking was allowed, It could be concluded 
that banks in unit-banking areas perform better than those in 
branching areas.^ Unlike Edwards' first study, however, Beighley and 
McCall failed to Include a dummy variable for differences in branching 
laws. Thus, they failed to Investigate whether, at any level of con­
centration in banking markets, banks perform differently under separate 
branching laws.
Three studies have avoided the necessity of determining variations 
in bank performance due to differing branching laws by studying market 
concentration and bank behavior in areas that have the same branching 
laws.̂  George Kaufmann used the market for small business loans in 
determining whether concentration had any significant effect on loan 
rates and rates on time deposits. Kaufmann's study was restricted to 
banks in Iowa, a unit-banking state, because he had estimated that 
about 90% of a typical bank's business in that state was obtained 
within county lines.^ This justified his use of a county as the
9Ibid., p. 462.
^George Kaufmann, "Bank Market Structure and Performance: The
Evidence from Iowa." Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 32, (April, 1966), 
pp. 239-249; Robert F. Ware, "Banking Structure and Performance; Some 
Evidence from Ohio," Economic Review. Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 
Vol. 54, (March, 1972), pp. 3-14, Alexander J. Yeats, "Further Evidence 
on the Structure-Performance Relationship in Banking," Journal of 
Economics and Business, Vol. 26, (Winter, 1974), pp. 95-100.
^Kaufmann, op. cit.. p. 430.
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market area for an individual bank. Using data for 1959 and 1960, 
Kaufmann computed a concentration ratio that measured the percentage 
of total deposits held by the largest bank in the county. Included 
in total county deposits when time deposit rates were the dependent 
variable were deposits of savings and loan associations. He also 
included, regardless of the dependent variable used, the number of 
banks in each county as a second concentration variable.
Kaufmann's empirical findings were, first, that the effects of 
concentration and the number of banks in each county on loan rates 
were statistically significant at the .05 level. It was found that 
a decrease of three banks in a county would, on the average, cause 
a rise in the mean Interest rate from 6.0 to 6.15 per cent. Also, a 
rise in the concentration ratio by 15 per cent was found to result 
in a rise in the mean Interest rate from 6.0 to 6.20 per cent. For 
interest rates on time deposits, both the concentration ratio and the 
number of banks were significant at the .05 level. An increase in the 
number of banks in the county by three resulted in a rise in the 
average rate on time deposits by sixteen to twenty base points. A 
15 per cent rise in the concentration ratio resulted in a lowering 
of rates on time deposits by an average of twenty to twenty-six base 
points.
The study by Robert Ware was restricted to 57 non-SMSA counties 
in the state of Ohio. This was done for two reasons.^ First, the 
banks in the non-SMSA counties, are, on the average, smaller than
l^Ware, pp. cit., p. 5.
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those in SMSA counties and generally derive from 80 to 90 per cent 
of all types of deposit and loan business from their respective 
counties. Secondly, under Ohio banking laws, a bank cannot establish 
branch offices outside the county in which the main office is located. 
This aspect of the law has a tendency to restrict the influence of a 
non-urban bank to the county market. Both of these considerations 
led Ware to conclude that counties would be useful indicators of a 
banking market.
As ameasure of concentration Ware used a two-bank concentration 
ratio, I.e., the proportion of total deposits in each county held in 
the two largest banks. For indicators of bank performance he used 
five separate variables computed from annual data furnished by the 
banks to the F.D.I.C. Each variable was an average of all banks 
within each county. These measures of bank performance are listed 
below.
y = total service charges on demand deposits 
1 tot^l demand deposits
V_ a net operating earnings 
total capital
V ■ total revenue on loans 
3 gross loans
Y = total interest paid on time and savings deposits
total time and Bavings deposits
- average price spread CV3 - V^)
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Using data for 1969 and 1970, Ware's empirical results failed 
to show any consistent relationship between concentration in banking 
markets and the five performance variables. Only for one year, 1970, 
and one variable, was the concentration variable significant at the 
.05 level. In this case a 10 per cent rise in the concentration ratio 
led to an increase in the price spread, V^, of an average of eight 
base points.
In the study by Alexander Yeats, bank structure in Louisiana and 
Tennessee were investigated because it was felt that in both states 
the relevant market for bank loans and deposits corresponded to county 
lines. The fact that both states limit branching to county lines 
undoubtedly had much to do with this premise.
Yeats' market structure variable was the Herfindahl index, defined 
as where is the proportional share of deposits of bank jL in
the area. The index reaches a maximum of 1.0 for one bank counties.
For dependent variables he used the ratios (yearly income)/(average 
yearly capital) and (yearly income)/(average yearly assets) as profit 
measures. Prices variables included (yearly interest paid)/(average 
yearly time deposits) and (yearly interest earned)/(average loans for 
year). The remaining performance variable was the average loan/deposit 
ratio for the year. The latter is sometimes used as a performance 
variable because the higher the ratio the more it is felt that a bank
13Yeats, op. cit., p. 96*
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Is serving local customers Instead of extending funds In a more 
nationally-oriented securities market.^
Yeats wished to take account of the fact that there may be no 
significant relation between structure and performance at low levels 
of concentration, but when concentration rises to some critical level 
a measurable relationship may be found. He first regressed all five 
performance variables against concentration and other independent 
variables, and found that, for 1970, the year of his study, in neither 
Tennessee nor Louisiana did any evident pattern exist between concen­
tration and bank performance. In fact, only the loan/deposit ratio 
for Louisiana showed any statistical significance at the .05 level. 
However, the direction of influence was positive, the direction not 
predicted by economic theory.
Yeats then substituted for the Herfindahl index a dummy variable 
to distinguish markets above and below a certain critical concentration 
value. The dummy variable assumed a value of 1 when concentration was 
above a certain critical value. He used five different critical values 
of the Herfindahl index, ranging from 0.20 to 0.60. He found that by 
using 0.60 as a critical value all five performance variables for 
Tennessee were significant at the .05 level. In addition the relation­
ships were in the direction posited by economic theory. The profits 
and loan rate variables were all positively related to the dummy
14A11 variables were averages for all banks in a county.
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variable while the time deposit rate variable and the loan/asset 
ratio were negatively related to the dummy variable. What this 
means is that bank performance was significantly different for banks 
in counties with a concentration ratio of above 0.60 than for banks 
in other counties. The results for Tennessee using other critical 
values for the dummy variable were not as consistent but did show 
that the higher the critical concentration value used, the more 
variables that were significantly related to concentration. The 
results for Louisiana did not Improve markedly with this method.
Only the loan/asset ratio was significant, and negatively related, 
to the dummy variable, but then only for one critical Herfindahl 
value, 0.50.
In summary the studies cited except for Ware's, are generally 
conclusive on the fact that market concentration does have a negative 
influence on bank performance. To the extent that regulatory offi­
cials restrict new bank entry, and thus intensify concentration in 
any banking market, these studies indicate there is a loss in social 
welfare.
BRANCHING LAWS AND BANK PERFORMANCE
Of the studies reviewed so far, with the exception of the first 
Edwards study, the effect of branching on bank performance has not 
been directly tested. Conclusions about the impact of branching laws 
have been inferred from the fact that since concentration in banking
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markets intensifies as branching laws become more liberal, banks in 
unit-banking states are most competitive and banks In statewide- 
branching states are least competitive. However, some studies do 
exist which attempt to determine if branching laws have any separate 
effect other than through differences in concentration. It is theo­
retically possible that at a given level of concentration, banks may 
be more competitive the more liberal are branching laws. This is 
because branching can be thought of as a method by which the geographic 
limits of banking markets are extended and the number of competitors 
Increased. The possibility of entry by banks outside a given market 
area could force existing banks in that area to either practice limit- 
entry pricing to deter entry or accept entry and be forced to lower 
prices because of Increased competition.^ Either possibility results 
in better performance by banks than if this threat of entry did not 
exist. If this thoery holds, then one would expect that at any level 
of concentration, the more liberal are branching laws, i.e., the 
greater the threat of entry, the more competitive banks must be. This 
being the case, population per bank office, which decreases the more 
liberal are branching laws, is a more useful indicator of actual com­
petitive pressures than population per bank, which increases as 
branching laws become more liberal.
^Bernard Shull and Paul Horvitz, "The Impact of Branch Banking 
on Bank Performance," in Studies in the Banking Structure . . ., 
op. cit., p. 176.
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Unfortunately, Edwards' first study is the only one which tries 
to discover if performance differs at any level of concentration due 
to differences in branching laws. Even his study was restricted to 
analyzing differences in unit-banking and branching areas in general 
while ignoring possible differences in limited and statewide areas as 
well.
Three studies have tried to answer the question of whether
liberalizing branching laws have any effect on performance by simply
comparing various performance variables among states.^ In their
study Shull and Horvitz made a tabular comparison of an average rate
on all loans between statewide-branching states and unit-banking
states for 1962 and 1963. They found that average loan rates for
banks in statewide areas were higher in both years. They attributed
the higher loan rates, though, to differences in loan portfolios
17between statewide and unit-banking states. Banks in statewide 
branching states typically make more retail consumer loans than banks 
in unit-banking states, and these loans typically carry higher yields 
than other loans. Thus the average interest rate on all loans is not 
a true indicator of actual competitive conditions. In fact, they went 
so far as to conclude that because of the threat of potential entry
■^Shull and Horvitz, op, cit., pp. 141-177; Franklin R. Edwards, 
"The Banking Competition Controversy," oj>. cit., pp. 303-334; and 
Bernard Anderson, An Investigation into the Effects of Banking Struc­
ture on Aspects of Bank Behavior (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The 
Ohio State University, 1964), pp. 289-293.
17Ibid., p. 175.
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from a larger geographic area, statewide-branching provided a more
18competitive atmosphere than unit-banking. A conclusion such as
this, of course, is highly tentative since Shull and Horvitz did not
make any statistical tests to determine if the higher loan rates
in the statewide-branching states were actually caused by differences
in the loan portfolio.
Franklin Edwards' second study also presented a tabular comparison
of interest rates for banks in all the SMSA's in the United States.
Banks were separated into those that were located in unit-banking
SMSA's and those that allowed branching. No differentiation was made
between limited and statewide-branching. Edwards further divided banks
into deposlt-size categories. His investigation revealed that except
for banks under $25 million in deposits, average rates on all loans
for 1962 were lower in unit-banking SMSA's than in statewide-branching
SMSA's. Furthermore, except for banks with over $500 million in
deposits, banks in unit-banking SMSA's offered higher mean rates on 
19time deposits.
The study by Anderson was an attempt to discover whether another 
performance variable, the loan/asset ratio, would differ according to 
differences in branching laws. In a 1962 study of banking in Cali­
fornia (statewide-branching), Ohio (limited-branching), and Illinois
18Ibid.. p. 176.
^Franklin Edwards, "The Banking Competition Controversy," 
op. cit., p. 316.
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(unit-banking), Anderson concluded that the more liberal the branching 
law, the higher were loan/asset ratios for banks.
The conclusions from these three studies, then, are mixed. No 
definite conclusion can be reached as to whether banks become more, 
or less, competitive as branching laws become more liberal. Further­
more, these studies are somewhat old. A glance at more recent data 
might help to determine how bank performance is affected by differences 
in branching laws. Unfortunately, this investigation does not reveal 
any firm conclusion either. Tables III-A and III-B show 1974 data for 
average Interest rates on all loans and loan/asset ratios for all banks 
in the United States, grouped by states according to branching law.
The data reveal that loan/asset ratios do rise as branching laws become 
more liberal but that average rates of return on all loans, for all 
bank sizes, are lower in limited-branching than in both unit-banking 
and statewide-branching states. Furthermore, the latter have higher 
rates than unit-banking states. Of course, tabular presentations such 
as these do not lead one to make any definite conclusions about the 
effects of branching on bank performance. There are other factors 
which undoubtedly have some effect on interest rates and loan/asset 
ratios which are not explicitly considered in a tabular presentation. 
Furthermore, the interest rates listed are average rates for 1974 on 
all loans, if there are differences in loan portfolios between banks 
under different branching laws, this could account for the differences 
in the rates listed. More recent 1974 data then, do not give any 
more definite conclusions about branching than do the three earlier
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Table III-A 
Average Rates of Return on Loans In 
The United States, Grouped by States According 
To Branching Law, 1974
Unit-Banking States
Rates of Return
Bank Deposit Size 
(in millions of dollars)
State Under 5M 5-10M 10-25M 25-100M over 100M
Arkansas 9.50 8.90 8.99 9.07 9.65
Colorado 10.06 9.96 9.92 10.05 10.78
Florida 10.86 9.97 9.56 9.58 9.94
Illinois 8.80 8.61 8.55 8.81 9.55
Iowa 8.69 8.61 8.46 8.65 9.30
Kansas 8.87 8.84 8.75 8.84 9.60
Minnesota 8.55 8.51 8.52 8.65 9.74
Missouri 8.59 8.65 8.76 8.81 9.31
Montana 9.39 8.82 8.69 8.99 9.09
Nebraska 8.61 8.59 8.84 9.00 9.88
North Dakota 9.59 9.24 8.80 8.58 —
Oklahoma 9.90 9.91 9.65 9.83 10.04
Texas 9.81 9.82 9.73 9.72 10.12
West Virginia 9.04 8.58 8.58 8.28 9.19
Wyoming 9.39 9.51 9.36 9.73 9.80






Bank Deposit Size 
(in millions of dollars)
State Under 5M 5-10M 10-25M 25-100M over 10(
Alabama 9.68 9.18 9.03 9.10 9.83
Georgia 9.40 9.29 9.25 9.59 10.96
Indiana 9.31 9.03 8.72 8.73 9.16
Kentucky 8.11 8.01 8.32 8.66 9.59
Louisiana 9.87 9.89 9.44 9.38 9.82
Massachusetts 9.83 9.53 9.38 9.64 10.27
Michigan 9.74 8.94 8.84 8.86 9.23
Mississippi 8.96 9.24 8.74 9.22 9.43
New Hampshire 9.44 9.20 9.29 9.73 8.98
New Jersey 9.82 9.78 8.89 8.71 8.96
New Mexico 9.87 10.01 9.58 9.68 10.06
New York 9.03 9.01 8.78 9.10 9.62
Ohio 8.41 8.52 8.52 8.94 9.17
Pennsylvania 8.55 8,17 8.14 8.29 8.89
Tennessee 9.27 9.22 9.02 9.10 10.00
Wisconsin 8.72 8.54 8.57 8.67 9.53







Bank Deposit Size 
(in millions of dollars)
Under 5M 5-1QM 10-25M 25-100M over 100M
Alaska — 10.90 — 10.40 10.30
Arizona 9.54 9.21 9.46 9.50 9.61
California 11.01 10.83 9.90 10.11 10.13
Connecticut 9.36 9.83 9.38 9.63 9.73
Delaware 8.04 8.77 8.35 8.49 9.16
Hawaii — — 11.30 — 10.15
Idaho 10.41 9.37 9.01 9.63 9.59
Maine 10.22 9.71 9.62 9.79 10.46
Maryland 7.97 8.64 8.41 8.67 9.38
Nevada — — 9.87 9.48 9.48
North Carolina 9.71 9.97 9.17 9.83 10.21
Oregon 9.78 9.21 9.03 9.13 9.45
Rhode Island 10.43 9.43 10.21 9.18 10.14
South Carolina 9.44 9.19 9.23 9.53 10.15
South Dakota 9.00 8.79 8.67 8.85 8.76
Utah 11.03 10.10 9.45 9.33 10.36
Vermont 7.93 8.41 8.40 8.83 9.42
Virginia 9.90 9.00 8.98 9.13 10.03
Washington 9.45 9.75 9.24 9.13 9.68
Average 9.57 9.48 9.31 9.37 9.80
Source: FDIC, Bank Operating Statistics, 1974; where no entry exists
it is because no bank of that particular deposit size exists in the 
state.
Table III-B 
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1974.
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studies. The evidence is mixed, and therefore further study, such as 
is presented in this dissertation, is ncessary before any general 
conclusions can be made.
SUMMARY
To the extent that interest rates and loan/asset ratios are 
meaningful indicators of the impact of bank performance on social 
welfare the studies cited in this chapter are useful. The first 
section reviewed those studies that sought to find a relationship 
between market concentration and bank performance. Generally, these 
studies are consistent in their findings. Increases in concentration 
lead to higher rates on loans, lower rates on time deposits, and lower 
loan/asset ratios. It has already been mentioned, however, that some 
of these studies contain a possible bias, if at any level of concen­
tration, performance differs because of differences in branching laws.
The second section of the chapter reviewed those studies which 
attempted to discover if there were differential effects due solely 
to differences in branching laws. Unfortunately, the research on this 
question is not extensive, gives Inconsistent results, and is insuf­
ficiently rigorous to provide any definite conclusions. Edwards' 
first study was the only one to investigate the question scientifically 
by Introducing a dummy variable in his model to differentiate between 
unit-banking SMSA's and SMSA's where some form of full-service branch­
ing was allowed. His findings were that no differences exist in
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performance between banks, at any level of concentration, in unit- 
banking SMSA's and branching SMSA's.
There are further problems with those studies which used concen­
tration ratios as an index of monopoly power. If one is Interested 
in measuring welfare losses from the restriction of new bank entry, 
which this dissertation is, then concentration ratios may not be the 
best indicator of how regulation has fostered monopoly power. Concen­
tration ratios, regardless of how they are defined, are probably 
greater in any market than they would have been in the absence of 
restrictions on new bank entry, but the exact magnitude would be dif­
ficult to determine. A better measure of the effect of regulation on 
market power in any banking market is population per bank. If one can 
determine the number of banks that would hypothetically exist in the 
absence of regulations on entry, a more useful population per bank 
figure can be computed. Then all that remains is to establish a rela­
tionship between some performance variable and population per bank 
where no restrictions on entry exist. This will then provide an 
estimate of how bank performance is altered by restrictions on entry, 
giving an indication of how regulation contributes to social welfare 
losses.
The selection of a proper performance variable, then, becomes 
important. A variable must be selected that is the most precise in 
measuring welfare losses from market power in commercial banking.
The principle variables used in previous studies, i.e., interest rates 
and loan/asset ratios, are not suitable for this purpose. Another
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variable, the elasticity of loan demand, is superior. The derivation 
of this variable, and the establishment of its superiority, is the 
subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER IV
A THEORY OF THE BANKING FIRM 
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter Is to develop a model of the banking 
firm which will Introduce the elasticity of loan demand as a perfor­
mance variable. This variable, which is indicative of the bank's 
monopoly position in its loan market, is the most accurate measure 
of social welfare losses due to this monopoly position. As will be 
shown later in the chapter, when the intent is to show welfare losses, 
other traditionally used performance variables suffer from weaknesses 
not found in the elasticity measure.
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS OF THE MODEL
Throughout this chapter it is assumed that commercial banks seek 
to maximize profits from their loans by extending credit into any 
market in which the marginal revenue earned from loans is greater than 
the marginal costs of their extension. In addition, it will be assumed 
that the costs included in the model are long-run costs. Since the 
predominant conclusion of bank cost studies is that long-run costs are
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generally constant, it will further be assumed In the model that 
long-run marginal costs are equal to long-run average costs.
The framework for the model was first presented by Bernard 
Shull.^ Shull views a bank as transforming Its deposit funds Into 
different credit products In a manner that maximizes profits. Margi­
nal cost Is assumed to be a function of the total volume of credit 
offered by the bank and is assumed not to vary significantly with 
changes In the credlt-product mix. Profit maximization implies that 
a bank will expand output into all credit markets where marginal 
revenue exceeds marginal cost. An equilibrium will be reached when 
the marginal revenue obtained from any credit product is equal to the 
marginal cost of extending credit in general. The simplest example 
of the model can be shown in Figure 1V-A. The bank is assumed to 
extend loans in only two markets, each of which exhibits different 
demand conditions. Equilibrium is achieved when OC^ of the first loan 
type is offered at interest rate r^> and C-jC^ of the second loan type 
is extended at rate ^ . Any further extension of credit would mean 
that the marginal revenue from either credit source is less than the 
marginal cost of extending credit. The credit mix is in equilibrium 
because a transfer of equal credit from one type of loan to another
-1-See George Bentson, "The Optimal Banking Structure," Journal of 
Bank Research. Vol. 3, (Winter, 1973), pp. 220-225.
^Bernard Shull, "Commercial Banks as Multiple-Product Price- 
Discriminating Firms," in Banking and Monetary Studies, Deane Carson, 
ed., (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963), pp. 351-368.
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Figure IV-A 




Loan Type 1 Loan Type 2
Credit Flow 
Source: Shull, op. cit., p. 355.
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would mean a smaller gain In marginal revenue from one source than Is 
being lost from the other.
Shull's contributions were refined In separate research by 
Michael Klein and Eric Brucker. Klein's development was mathe­
matical, while Brucker's was geometrical. For expository purposes 
the Brucker model will be presented.
Both Brucker and Klein argue that the government bills market 
for a bank's credit output can be viewed as a "dumping market" where 
no one bank can affect the market rate and due to the short term 
nature of the security, the market risk of capital gains or losses 
can be neglected. It follows that the average and marginal revenue 
earned on bills are equal. Following Shull, Brucker and Klein assume 
that marginal cost Is not a function of the product mix. Assuming 
profit maximization on the part of banks, they then argue that total 
credit output will be allocated so that the marginal revenue associated 
with each and every credit product is equal to the average revenue 
earned in the bills market. A simple version of the model is presented 
in Figure IV-B, which shows a bank making only one kind of loan.
Average revenue and marginal revenue are depicted for this loan 
type as DL and MR^. ARg and MRfi denote the average and marginal
Michael A. Klein, "Theory of the Banking Firm," Journal of Money, 
Credit, and Banking, Vol. 3, (May, 1971), pp. 210-213; and Eric 
Brucker, "A Microeconomic Approach to Banking Competition," Journal 
Finance, Vol. 25, (December, 1970), pp. 1133-1141.
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Source: Brucker, op. cit.« p. 1134.
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revenue for government bills. MCt of course, describes the marginal 
cost function for the bank. The total volume of credit allocated 
would be OE, where the marginal revenue from each credit market is 
equal to the marginal cost of total credit production. OB would be 
the amount extended in loans at interest rate OC and BE in bills 
would be purchased at rate OA.
Using this model it is now possible to compute the elasticity 
of demand facing the bank at point D for this particular loan type. 
Consider the following expression of marginal revenue:
where AR^ is the average revenue per loan and e^ is the elasticity of 
loan demand. Since, in equilibrium, MR^ = MRg = ARg, the equation can 
be expressed as
ARB “ ARg (1 - -1)
ARfi - ARl - A R ^
ABl/eL " ARL ” ^ B
This elasticity figure can be easily computed if one knows the 
average revenue from both loans and government bills. It should be 
noted that this elasticity figure can be interpreted as a meaningful 
indicator of the bank's relative monopoly power in this loan market
because it is simply the inverse of the Lerner index of monopoly 
power, (P-MC)/P.^ Relatively speaking, a low value for eL and a 
high value for the Lerner index both indicate a high degree of 
monopoly power.
THE COMPLETE MODEL
The Brucker-Klein model contains a fundamental error in assuming 
that the marginal cost of acquiring bank credit is not a function of 
the credit mix. For one thing, different types of loans entail dif­
ferent costs. These costs will differ, primarily due to differences 
in risks and costs of obtaining credit information. Secondly, the 
cost of acquiring government bills is virtually non-existent. It 
cannot be assumed, then, as Klein and Brucker have done, that the 
cost of lending an additional dollar In one loan market is necessarily 
the same as in another loan market. Nor can it be assumed that it 
costs the same to acquire any additional dollar of loans as it does 
to acquire an additional dollar in government bills.
^Consider that for any type of output, where ed equals the 
elasticity of demand for that output,
MG - PCI - —i) 
edTherefore,
MC - P - P/ed
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For this reason, the Brucker-Klein model must be modified. The 
revised model is shown in Figure IV-C.̂
The profit-maximizing bank will not expand loan output until 
marginal revenue equals the marginal cost of loan extension. Instead, 
it will expand loan output until marginal revenue equals the marginal 
cost of loan extension plus the marginal revenue obtained from govern­
ment bills. In other words the bank must consider the opportunity 
cost of foregone revenues by not investing the marginal dollar in the 
government bills market, where a positive yield can be earned. Maxi­
mization of profits would not occur where MR^ = MC^ because the profit 
on the last dollar loaned is equal to zero and a positive return could 
have been earned in the government bills market. Frofit-maximization, 
then, would entail
MR^ ■ MC^ + MRg or 
MR^ - ACL + ARB 6
The question must eventually rise that if profit-maximization 
entails expanding loan output until the marginal revenue of acquiring
^It should be noted that Figure IV-C also uses constant long run 
costs for the reasons cited earlier. The demand and cost curves 
describe conditions in one particular loan market, but the conclusions 
readily apply to other loan markets as well.
^tfith n number of credit assets, including government bills, the 
equilibrium conditions are more fully stated as
MR2 . . . ~ MRn 
HC1 + MRg * MC2 + MRg MCn + MRjj
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one asset equals its marginal opportunity cost, why, since the 
acquisition of government bills is costless, and they always earn 
a positive return, is there no limit to their acquisition. The 
answer to this question is found when one considers a general equi­
librium for the banking firm, which involved the deposit, or liability, 
market as well as the loan market. The previous theories of the bank­
ing firm have completely ignored the deposit market.
One possible way to show this general equilibrium is seen in 
Figure IV-D, where it is assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that 
a bank makes only one type of loan and acquires only one type of 
deposit. The marginal cost of obtaining funds is assumed to be an 
increasing function, and includes the lost revenues from not being 
able to loan out all acquired funds due to reserve requirements.^
In equilibrium the firm would acquire in net deposits, i.e., 
total deposits less required reserves. To maximize profits from these 
funds it would extend OC^ in loans and acquire C2C2 in government 
bills. It would not acquire any more government bills because the 
cost of an additional dollar in deposits is greater than the y i e l d  
of the government bill.
^A rising cost curve for deposits and a constant cost curve for 
loans is not an unrealistic assumption, even if the costs considered 
are long-run costs. As stated previously, the empirical research on 
bank costs concludes that administrative costs are generally constant 
in the long run. The marginal cost function for deposits in Figure 
IV-D includes interest payments made on these deposits. And, even in 
the long run, banks can be expected to raise interest rates on these 
deposits in order to attract a greater amount of funds.
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Figure IV-D








With this modification of the Brucker-Klein model the computa­
tion of the elasticity of loan demand is altered. The AC^ figure 
does not now reflect the entire opportunity cost of making the loan.
The true opportunity cost is AC^ +  ARg. For this reason the elas­
ticity of loan demand is now
eL ARl - (ACl + ARg)
THE ELASTICITY OF LOAN DEMAND AND THE MEASUREMENT 
OF LOSSES IN SOCIAL WELFARE
Welfare losses to the public are directly related to the elas­
ticity of demand facing any firm, whether it be a bank or a drug store. 
This is because of the link between a firm's monopoly position and the 
elasticity of the demand curve facing it. One would expect that the 
more competitors a firm has, the less monopoly power it holds, and 
thus the more elastic is the demand curve facing it; therefore welfare 
losses are smaller.
A technique for measuring welfare losses due to monopoly was
o
suggested by Arnold Harberger in 1954. His ideas for their measure­
ment were later used in subsequent empirical estimations of welfare 
losses.^ The method is best described in Figure IV-E. Assuming
OArnold C. Harberger, "Monopoly and Resource Allocation," American 
Economic Review, Vol. 43, (May* 1954), pp. 77-87.
^David Kamerschen, An Estimation of the Welfare Losses from 
Monopoly in the American Economy. (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Michigan State University, 1964).
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Figure IV-E 








constant long run costs, an Industry that Is perfectly competitive 
will produce at point C, where P * LMC - LAC.10 If the industry is 
monopolized, and the cost function remains the same, output would be 
restricted to and price would rise to P^. The welfare loss to 
society is the loss in consumer surplus caused by the monopolist's 
price and output decision. This welfare loss is measured by triangle 
ABC.
There is one comment to be made about the computation of these 
losses. The loss is less the more elastic is the demand curve for 
the product. This can be seen in Figure IV-F, which shows two demand 
curves, one more elastic than the other. For the sake of simplicity, 
it is assumed that the demand and marginal revenue functions under 
both conditions are such that the profit-maximizing level of output 
is the same in both instances. Geometrically, this means that as the 
demand curve rotates counterclockwise around point C, the marginal 
revenue curve is revolving counterclockwise around point B, thus 
causing the distance between Pm and Pc to diminish. The impact of 
this qualification is that if the monopolist is subject to Increased
^Despite the fact that long run costs are constant under perfect 
competition, there still is a unique solution at output level Qc .
In perfect competition, of course, each individual firm faces a 
perfectly elastic demand curve, and with constant long-run costs, 
it would appear that there Is no unique equilibrium. However, the 
long-run costs depicted in Figure IV**E are industry costs, and it 
is certainly conceivable that the individual firms' cost curves 
could be U-shaped while the cost curve for the industry is perfectly 
horizontal. This possibility means that as the industry expands, 
the individual firms' costs do not rise, i.e., each firm's U-shaped 
cost curve remains stationary.
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competition, one would expect a gain In social welfare. This gain 
Is shown In Figure 1V-F by the difference between triangles ABC and 
DBC.11
It Is now obvious that welfare losses to society from bank entry 
and branching restrictions can be directly shown by using the model 
for the banking firm developed earlier In the chapter. Referring back 
to Figure IV-C on page 84, welfare losses are denoted by tralngle FGH. 
Some of these losses would undoubtedly exist, even if there were no 
restrictions on new bank entry and anything other than unit-banking 
was prohibited. This is because, even if these two situations existed, 
it is improbable that commercial banking would result in perfect com­
petition. However, official restrictions on new bank entry and 
policies which allow branching could conceivably lower the elasticities 
of demand for existing banks by reducing the number of independent 
competitors. This would serve to increase welfare losses above what 
they normally would be.
H-Since one is working with two different demand curves the fact
that the elasticity of demand at point I) is higher than at point A is
not readily obvious. However, the fact that Pml is greater than Pm2 
assures this result. Consider that
MRi - V U  - 1/ej.)
“*2 ’ pm 2 ^  " 1/e2>
where e-i and e« are the elasticities of demand for each curve. Since
MR-l - MR2 in Figure IV-F,
Fmi Cl " l/e^) “ Cl " l/e2̂
This means that since P . is greater than P ^ ,  e^ must be smaller than 
e2 to achieve the desired equality.
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THE SUPERIORITY OF THE ELASTICITY OF LOAN DEMAND 
AS AN INDICATOR OF WELFARE LOSSES
If one's intent is to show the relationship between a bank's 
monopoly power in the loan market and social welfare losses, the 
elasticity of loan demand is a more meaningful indicator of these 
losses than either the level of Interest rates that it charges or 
its loan/asset ratio. These latter two variables have been the most 
often-used measure of bank performance.
A problem with using the level of interest rates as an indica­
tor of bank monopoly power occurs in actual empirical studies when 
the researcher does not use actual rates of return on individual loan 
types but rather some average return on all loans. Since the costs 
of extending loans differ by type, two banks with the same average 
return but different loan portfolios will not have the same average 
elasticity of demand. The bank with the high-cost portfolio will 
have a higher elasticity of demand, and thus smaller welfare losses.
The studies by Ware and Yeats cited in the previous chapter made this 
error in attempting to explain the relationship between concentration 
in banking markets in Tennessee, Louisiana, and Ohio and certain per­
formance variables, including the average rate of return on all loaned
12Since this dissertation will be using figures for average rates 
of return on all loans, this criticism of simple levels of rates is an 
important consideration. This problem of using average rates on all 
loans is overcome in the following chapter. Both average rates, and 
average costs, for all loans will be used in computing the elasticity 
of loan demand. Thus, a higher average rate of return caused by a 
high-risk, high-cost portfolio will not necessarily indicate a high 
degree of monopoly power because the average cost for all loans should 
be high also.
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The loan/asset ratio is also a less efficient measure of welfare 
losses than the elasticity of loan demand. It is possible that two 
banks may have the same loan/asset ratio but may exhibit different 
elasticities of demand and thus different welfare losses. Consider 
Figure 1V-G. In this simple case there are two banks in two separate 
loan markets. Both banks, it is assumed, offer only one type of 
deposit and one type of loan. Furthermore, they each have identical 
cost functions, but face different demand curves. The profit-maxi­
mizing condition for both banks entails a loan/asset ratio of CK^/OC^
but Bank 1, because it faces a more elastic demand curve, charges a
1 ̂lower interest rate than Bank 2 . J Welfare losses are therefore lower 
for Bank 1 than Bank 2, as signified by the fact that triangle BCD 
is less than triangle ACD.
It is even possible that a bank with a lower loan/asset ratio can 
exhibit lower welfare losses than a bank with a higher loan/asset 
ratio. This situation is depicted in Figure IV-H, which again shows 
the one deposit, one loan banks of Figure IV-G. In this case, profit- 
maximizing results in a loan/asset ratio for Bank 1 of OC3/OC1 , which 
is less than (X^/OC^, the loan/asset ratio for Bank 2. Welfare losses
^ T h e  reader is referred to footnote 11 on page 91 for an 
explanation of why the elasticity of loan demand at point IJ is 
greater than at point A.
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Figure IV-G
r Identical Loan/Asset Ratios - Differing Welfare Losses
Deposit Flow









for Bank 1, indicated by triangle DEF, are nevertheless smaller than 
the welfare losses from Bank 2, shown by triangle ABC.^
Furthermore, the elasticity of loan demand is the only perfor­
mance variable that allows an actual estimation of numerical welfare 
losses. This is an important consideration since the computation of 
welfare losses due to the regulations on new bank entry is an integral 
part of the next chapter.
Suppose one wished to compare welfare losses of triangles ABC 
and DBC in Figure IV-F. One way to do this is to start at output 
0QC, where price 0PC is charged, regardless of the demand curve that 
exists. Then one should compute how high prices would have to rise 
in order to have output reduced to 0Qm. Prices would have to rise to 
0Pm2 if demand conditions were represented by D2 and to 0Pm  ̂if demand 
conditions were represented by D-̂ . To compute the actual magnitudes 
for OPmi and 0Pm2» one would need to know the average elasticity of 
demand for the particular demand curves over the output range 0QC - 0Qm. 
For example, to find 0Pm2» one would compute the percentage rise in 
price, %aOPc, that would occur if output was reduced by a certain 
percentage, %AOQc, from 0QC to OQm. This percentage rise in price 
is equal to (%AOQc)/eji, where e ^  is the average elasticity of demand 
for demand curve over the output range 0QC - 0Qm. OP̂ i would then
l^Again, since both marginal revenues are equated to a common 
value, ARg + AC^, the reasoning in footnote 11 on page 91 is also 
a valid explanation for why the elasticity of demand at point I) is 
higher than at point A,
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equal 0PC(1 + %AOPc). One would then have the necessary information 
to compute the area of triangle ABC which would be the welfare losses 
resulting from the demand conditions depicted by D^. These losses 
would be equal to 1/2 [(0QC - 0Qm) x (OPn,-) - 0PC)].
To find the welfare losses resulting from demand conditions 
denoted by D2, one would follow the same procedure. The percentage 
rise in price would be equal to C%AQc)/ed2» where e.̂ 2 is the average 
elasticity of demand for demand curve D2 over the output range 
0QC - 0Qm. 0Pm2 would then equal 0PC(1 + %AOPc). The welfare losses 
due to the existence of demand conditions, D2, which is the area of 
triangle DBC, is equal to 1/2 [(0QC - 0Qm) x (0Pm2 - 0PC)].
IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL FOR REGULATORY POLICY
The purpose of developing the model of the banking firm was to 
introduce the elasticity of loan demand as an indicator of bank per­
formance. The purpose of showing that welfare losses are best measured 
by the elasticity of loan demand is important if one is to establish 
a link from entry and branching restrictions to the level of competi­
tion in a banking market to social welfare losses. The establishment 
of this link is the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER V
THE IMPACT OF ENTRY AND BRANCHING RESTRICTIONS 
IN COMMERCIAL BANKING ON SOCIAL WELFARE
INTRODUCTION
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, 
the two hypotheses set out in Chapter I will be tested. In order to 
do this a model will be developed that will attempt to explain changes 
in the elasticity of loan demand facing commercial banks. As argued 
in the previous chapter, this variable is a better indicator of wel­
fare losses in commercial banking than previously used measures, which 
means that changes in this variable that are the result of regulatory 
policy provide a more accurate estimate of how regulation affects 
social welfare. If the first hypothesis is accepted,, the magnitude 
of losses in social welfare caused by restricting new bank entry will 
be estimated.
TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
To test both hypotheses, a model to explain the average elas­
ticity of loan demand for commercial banks over the period 1968-1974 
is developed. The model uses as its sample the 297 economic areas 
listed by the FDIC in its annual publication, Bank Operating Statis­
tics. One-hundred sixty-seven of these areas are in unit-banking
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states, 111 are In limited-branching states, and 19 are In statewide- 
branching states. For each of these economic areas an elasticity of 
loan demand is computed. As was stated in the previous chapter, the
elasticity of loan demand can be expressed as
AKl
®I. " ARl - (ARg + Af^)
The next task will be to define what data was actually included 
In the computation of the elasticity of loan demand for each area.
The AR^ figure represents the average return on all loans, including 
those made to state and local governments, but not those to the 
federal government. The rates on state and local bonds are included 
because, unlike the market for U.S. government bonds, the market for 
state and local government bonds does not present a commercial bank 
with a perfectly elastic demand curve for credit.
This ARl  figure is computed as an average for all banks in each
area over the period 1968-1974. The figure is computed from data
published in Bank Operating Statistics. An average return for all 
banks must be used because the FDIC does not list rates of return for 
individual banks in each region. The FDIC does list separately, for 
each year, the average rate of return for banks in each region on all 
loans granted to private individuals and businesses as well as the 
average rate of return on state and local government bonds held by
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commercial banks.* For example, in Economic Area 9 for Che state of 
Florida for the year 1974 the average rates of return on loans to 
private units was 10.13 per cent, while the return on state and local 
bonds was 4.61 per cent. Taking an average of all figures for the 
years 1968-1974, the result is an average return on all loans to pri­
vate units of 8.39 per cent and an average return on state and local 
bonds of 4.40 per cent. These figures were then used to obtain a 
value for AR^ for this area.
However, a simple average of the two could not be used. First, 
interest earned on state and local bonds is tax exempt so that the 
equivalent yield on a fully taxable basis is higher. Since the 
corporate tax rate has been roughly 48 per cent over the time period 
of the study, the listed rate on state and local bonds was multiplied 
by 1.96. This procedure gave a better indication of the fully-taxable 
yields on these bonds. For example, the fully-taxable yield on state 
and local bonds for 1968-1974 in Economic Area 9 of Florida was
4.40 x 1.96 - 8.62
The average rate of return on all loans made to private indivi­
duals and businesses, as listed by the FDIC, is, for any given year, 
equal to total interest earned on these loans during the year by the 
banks in the area divided by the average amount of loans held by 
banks during the year. The average rate of return on all state and 
local bonds is the total amount of interest earned on these bonds 
during the year by commercial banks divided by the average amount 
of these bonds held by hanks during the year. Since some of both 
assets were undoubtedly acquired in previous years, the average return 
on either asset will actually be some weighted average of rates that 
prevailed not only in the current year but in previous years as well.
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Second, private loans and state and local bonds are not held In 
equal amounts by banks In any particular area. Thus, each rate must 
be weighted according to the proportion of total credit that each of 
the assets entail. These proportions are also listed by the FDIC In 
Bank Operating Statistics. Over the period 1968-1974 in Economic Area 
9 for the state of Florida, of total credit extended to private units 
and state and local governments, 26.3 per cent was in state and local 
bonds, and the remainder, 73.7 per cent, was in loans to private 
units. Thus, the weighted ARl  figure used in the elasticity equation 
for this area was
.263 (.8.62) + .737 (8.39) - 8.45
The same procedure was used to compute AR^ for all 297 economic areas.
The ARg figure in the elasticity equation is the average return 
during 1968-1974 on all U.S. government securities held by banks iii a 
given area. For example, during the period 1968-1974 the average 
return on all U.S. government securities held by banks in Economic 
Area 9 for the state of Florida was 5.74 per cent. There are two 
reasons for using the average return on all U.S. government securities 
rather than just U.S. Treasury bills. The first is the practical
^For a given economic area, the average rate of return on U.S. 
government securities in any given year, as listed by the FDIC, is 
equal to total interest earned by all banks in the area on these 
securities divided hy the average amount of those assets held by banks 
during the year. For any year, then, the average rate of return listed 
will be a weighted average of rates that prevailed in the current year 
and previous years, since some of these securities were undoubtedly 
acquired in earlier years.
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consideration that the FDIC does not publish separately the average 
rate on Treasury bills, but rather combines this rate with those on 
other U.S. securities. Second, while the ARg figure should only 
Include rates on risk-free U.S. government securities, the risk of 
capital loss on U.S. securities other than Treasury bills Is probably 
not so great as to warrant their exclusion from ARg even if more 
detailed data were available.
The next step is to define how AC^ in the elasticity equation 
was computed for each economic area. As explained earlier the AR^ 
and ARg figures Include Interest rates on loans and bonds that pre­
vailed before 1968.^ Therefore, the AC^ figure should also include 
loan costs that prevailed before 1968. The most exact data on admini­
strative loan costs is published by the Federal Reserve in its annual 
publication, Functional Cost Analysis. The only years available to 
the author were the years 1966-1973, so an AC^ figure for each economic 
area was computed from data for these years.
The published cost figures, which are listed as a percentage of 
each dollar invested in a particular loan type, are obtained from 
questionnaires sent to 942 banks of varying sizes throughout the 
county. These rates are especially useful because they represent 
what bankers themselves feel actual loan costs to be. In the publi­
cation Functional Cost Analysis loan categories are broken down into
^See page 100, footnote 1 , and page 101, footnote 2 .
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three different types: commercial and agricultural; real estate; and
4consumer Installment loans. For each year the unit costs on these 
different loan types are listed by bank size. Table V-A shows a 
listing for the year 1972.
An average unit-cost over all bank sizes for each loan type was 
computed for the years 1966-1973. The average was taken over all 
banks because virtually all the economic areas include banks in each
Table V-A
Average Unit-Costs for Selected Loan Types, 
by Bank Size, 1972 
(as a percent of each dollar invested)
Bank Size 
(in millions of dollars of deposits) 
Loan Type under 50 50-200 over 200 Average
Commercial and Agricultural 1.353 1.142 1.142 1.185
Real Estate 0.854 0.692 0.689 0.745
Consumer Installment 3.157 3.189 3.250 3.199
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Functional Cost Analysis, 1972,
pp. 11-14.
of the three deposit-size categories. The resulting figures show that 
over this period the average unit-cost, as a percentage of each dollar 
invested, of making a commercial or agricultural loan, was 1.19 per
4No figure is listed for the administrative cost of acquiring 
bonds of state and local governments. This omission is undoubtedly 
due to the fact that the administrative costs of acquiring these bonds 
is insignificant. It will be assumed in this dissertation that these 
costs are zero.
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cent; a real estate loan, 0.73 per cent; and a consumer Installment 
loan, 3.24 per cent.
To compute these administrative loan costs for each economic 
area the above figures were multiplied by the proportion of total 
loans of each loan type existing In the economic area over the years 
1968-1974. These latter figures are also obtained from the FDIC's 
Bank Operating Statistics. As an example of how administrative costs 
were computed, consider Economic Area 9 for the state of Florida.
Over the period 1968-1974, 27.9 per cent of total credit extended to 
private units and state and local governments was In commercial and 
agricultural loans, 17.7 per cent was in real estate loans, 28.1 per 
cent was in consumer Installment loans, and 26.3 per cent was in loans 
to state and local governments. For this area, the estimated average 
administrative costs of granting loans, as a percentage of the average 
dollar loaned, was
1.19 (.279) + 0.73 (.177) + 3.24 (.281) +  0.00 (.263) - 1.37
Administrative costs, though, are not the only costs of extending 
a loan. Loans will carry some degree of risk, which is a bona fide 
cost of granting a loan. Therefore, the computed AC^ figure for each 
economic area must include some proxy for risk. This proxy was ob­
tained by using, for each economic area, the variable (provision for 
loan losses/loans), which Is published In Bank Operating Statistics. 
This variable indicates how much funds, as a proportion of the average
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number of loans for that year, banks In the area put aside to cover 
non-payment of loans they expect to default. Since state and local 
governments sometimes default on their bond repayments, it can cer­
tainly be assumed that provisions for loan losses include possible 
default by state and local governments on their bonds.
Since this variable provides a good estimate of what percentage 
of loans will actually default, it thus serves well as a risk proxy. 
The average for this variable over the years 1968-1974 was added to 
the average administrative costs over the same time period to estimate 
ACl for each economic area. For example, for Economic Area 9 of the 
state of Florida, the average for this risk variable was 0.39 per cent. 
Adding this figure to the average administrative cost of making loans 
gives an estimate of ACL for this area, as a percentage of each dollar 
loaned, of
1.37 + 0.39 - 1.76
All the necessary variables have been obtained to compute the 
average elasticity of loan demand for the area in the example. This 
elasticity is
e » _______ 8̂ 45_______
T* 8.45 - (5.74 + 1.76)
e - 8.45




This procedure was repeated for all 297 economic areas listed 
by the FDIC. The statewide averages, which are the sums of all the 
elasticities of each economic area in the state divided by the number 
of areas, are listed in Appendix V-A at the end of the chapter.
In an attempt to explain the elasticity of loan demand in any 
economic area, the area elasticities were regressed against eight 
structural and demand variables and two dummy variables. These vari­
ables are listed below.
XI = average population per bank in each economic area, 1968-1974 
X2 = median family income in each economic area, 1970 
X3 = proportion of total assets that were state and local bonds, 
1968-1974, for each economic area 
X4 = proportion of total assets that were commercial and industrial 
loans, 1968-1974, for each economic area 
X5 = proportion of total assets that were agricultural loans, 1968- 
1974, for each economic area 
X6 = proportion of total assets that were real estate loans, 1968- 
1974, for each economic area 
X7 = proportion of total assets that were consumer installment loans, 
1968-1974, for each economic area 
X8 = ratio of total credit-granting Institutions in the economic area
to the number of commercial banks in the area
X9 = 0 if the area is in either a unit-banking or statewide-branching
area; 1 if it is in a limited-branching area
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X10 - 0 if the area is in either a unit-banking or limited-branching 
area; 1 if it is in a statewide-branching area.
The demand variables are X2 through X7. X2, median family
income, will probably be positively related to the elasticity of 
loan demand. This relationship is due to the fact that a higher 
income usually means higher educational levels. High incomes, then, 
would indicate that customers of banks are usually more knowledgeable 
and will shop around more for better terms on loans, forcing banks 
to become more competitive.
The variables X3 through X7 indicate how the elasticity of loan 
demand will fluctuate with differences in the loan portfolio.
Ceteris paribus, the higher the elasticity of loan demand for any 
particular loan type, and the greater the proportion of total assets 
that are of this particular type, the higher is the overall elasticity 
of demand. The expected sign of each coefficient for these variables 
cannot be determined priori because so many factors need to be 
considered.^
^Total assets, rather than total loans, was used in the denomi­
nator for variables X3 through X7 because in computing AC^ for each 
economic area the weighting factor was the proportion of total loans 
of each individual loan type. Since AC^ was directly used in com­
puting eL for each area, to use as an independent variable a figure 
that was used in computing the dependent variable would create an 
interdependence among the independent and dependent variables. This 
interdependence would bias the statistical results.
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X8 Is one of the structural variables in the model. This variable 
is the ratio of total credit-granting institutions in each economic 
area to the number of commercial banks In the area, as of 1970. Unlike 
the coefficients for variables X3 through X7, the coefficient for X8 
can be predicted a priori. One would expect that the more non-bank 
competitors that borrowers face, i.e., the higher the value of X8, 
the more elastic is the demand curve facing individual banks.
The variables that are crucial in testing both hypotheses are 
XI, population per bank, and the dummy variables, X9 and X10. XI is 
the structural variable which indicates the degree to which new bank 
entry has been regulated in any one economic area. The higher this 
value, ceteris paribus, the greater are the restrictions on new bank 
entry. One would expect that the higher this value the lower the 
elasticity of loan demand in any area because of a greater amount of 
monopoly power. Mathematically, this variable is defined similarly to 
population per bank-2 in Table II-E on pages 41-43, except that now 
the variable indicates monopoly power for an economic area rather than 
an entire state. In this model
Xl± = _________ Pj(1970)___________
n n




where Xl^ Is the average population per bank in economic area i_, over 
the years 1968-1974; is the population of economic area î for 1970; 
and b£j(1968) and b^j(1974) are the number of banks in county in 
economic area i. for the years 1968 and 1974 respectively.
Now, as shown in Chapter II, population per bank increases the 
more liberal are branching laws. The variable population per bank is 
affected by both restrictions on new bank entry and branching laws. 
Thus, any statistical relationship between XI and the elasticity of 
loan demand may not be solely attributed to a policy of chartering new 
banks. To account for this factor, the two dummy variables, X9 and 
X10, are used. Ceteris paribus, the coefficient for X9, if significant 
and positive, will indicate the extent to which the elasticity of loan 
demand is greater in limited-branching areas than in unit-banking 
areas. Similar reasoning for statewide-branching areas would hold if 
X10 were significant and positive. One would also expect that if more 
liberal branching laws increase competition, then the coefficient for 
X10 would be greater than the coefficient for X9, signifying that, 
ceteris paribus, elasticities of loan demand are greater in statewide- 
branching areas than in limited-branching areas.
These three variables, XI, X9» and X1Q, will be the basis for 
accepting or rejecting the hypotheses set out in Chapter I. If XI 
is negatively related to the elasticity of loan demand, and statis­
tically significant, then it can be concluded that by restricting new 
bank entry, chartering officials have increased the monopoly power of
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banks, and thus have contributed to losses In social welfare.
Secondly, If neither X9 nor X10 are statistically significant, then 
this will provide the basis for accepting the hypothesis that unit- 
banking Is the more competitive banking structure. Statistically 
insignificant dummy variables indicate that, holding all other vari­
ables in the model constant, the elasticity of loan demand is not 
affected by differences in branching laws. One can then conclude 
that since there is no difference in performance at any population 
per bank, unit-banking, because it leads to a lower population per 
bank, leads to better performance by banks and thus smaller losses 
in social welfare. Similarly, limited-area branching leads to better 
performance, and smaller welfare losses, than statewide-branching 
because it leads to a lower value of population per bank.
To test these hypotheses, thirteen separate equations, depending 
on how the independent variables were specified, were estimated.
These equations are shown in Appendix V-B at the end of this chapter. 
Equation 5 was selected as the best equation to use because although 
it had a slightly smaller R^ than equations 6 , 7, and 8 , its Durbin- 
Watson value was high enough to conclude, at the .01 level of signifi­
cance, that autocorrelation does not exist among the error terms.
The Durbin-Watson values for equations 6 , 7, and 8 were all in the 
indeterminate range. Likewise, equations 10 and 11 had higher Durbin- 
Watson values, indicating less correlation among the error terms than 
in equation 5, but the R^s for equations 10 and 11 were much lower.
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Equation 5 is shown below. The t-values are in parentheses, 
below the respective coefficients. XI, X2, X6, X7, and X8 are all 
significant at the .05 level of significance.
log Ed = -0.257 - 0.393 log XI + 0.292 log X2 - 0.042 log X3 
(-0.49) (-7.57) (2.16) (-0.27)
+ 0.223 log X4 + 0.236 X5 + 0.810 X6 + 1.024 X7 
(1.88) (1.27) (4.92) (3.84)




The results of this equation reveal that slightly over one-half 
of the variation of elasticity of loan demand has been explained. The fact 
that both structural variables, XI and X8, are significant and in the pre­
dicted direction indicates that increased competition between banks and 
other credit-granting institutions force banks to become more com­
petitive. The positive coefficient for X2 reveals that as incomes 
rise, the elasticity of loan demand rises, perhaps indicating that 
indeed a better educated public does shop around more closely for 
better loan terms. The two other demand variables that are statis­
tically significant, X6 and X7, both have positive coefficients. This 




consumer Installment loans Is more elastic than the overall demand 
for loans.
What is important for this dissertation is that the equation 
indicates that both hypotheses can be accepted. First* XI* popula­
tion per bank* is statistically significant and negatively correlated 
with the elasticity of loan demand. Thus, the higher is population 
per bank* the lower is the elasticity of loan demand. By restricting 
the number of new bank formations below what it would otherwise have 
been* chartering officials have served to reduce social welfare by 
increasing population per bank. Secondly* neither dummy variable is 
statistically significant. This indicates that, holding all other 
variables in the model constant* branching of any sort does not lead 
to an Improvement in bank performance over unit-banking. Furthermore* 
since population per bank increases as branching laws become more 
liberal, and population per bank is negatively related to the elas­
ticity of loan demand, it can be concluded that the more liberal are 
branching laws, the more monopoly power that arises, and the greater 
are losses to social welfare.
THE ESTIMATION OF WELFARE LOSSES FROM THE 
RESTRICTION OF NEW BANK ENTRY
In this section of the chapter the welfare losses from the 
restrictive chartering philosophy embodied in by the Banking Act 
of 1935 will be estimated. The first step is to estimate welfare
.1.13
losses as they actually exist in the presence of regulation. These 
losses are the result of both market and political forces. Not all 
the monopolistic element in banking can be attributed to restrictive 
chartering policies. The next step is to estimate the number of 
banks that would hypothetically exist in each economic area had 
restrictive chartering not existed. Then the equation stated in the 
first section of the chapter will be used to determine how much the 
actual elasticity of loan demand will increase as the population per 
bank decrease in each economic area. A new welfare loss will be com­
puted which will be the loss due to market imperfections. This loss 
will be subtracted from the previously computed loss to give a loss 
due to restrictive bank chartering.6
This procedure can best be shown by example, again referring to 
Economic Area 9 for the state of Florida. An average demand curve 
for all loans over the years 1968-1974 is shown in Figure V-A. This 
demand curve, and those for all economic areas, it is assumed, has 
constant elasticity, throughout the relevant range to be used in this 
study. As shown earlier, this demand curve for Economic Area 9 for 
the state of Florida was estimated to have an elasticity of 8.894.
**In Chapter II it was noted that there has been a tendency for 
increased liberalization of branching laws. This has led to a gen­
eral increase in population per bank nationwide. However, it is 
safe to assume that this tendency for Increased liberalization of 
branching laws is Independent of whether or not the Banking Act of 
1935 had been enacted. In other words the nationwide population per 
bank would be higher than in 1935 even if the Banking Act of 1935 
did not exist. Therefore an estimation of the population per bank 
that would exist in each economic area in the absence of restrictive 
chartering should not be biased by changes in branching laws since 1935.
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The average unit cost of extending loans was found to be 1.76 as a 
percentage of each dollar invested. This cost, assumed constant, 
is shown as ACL in Figure V-A. The average return on loans and state 
and local bonds for the period 1968-1974 was 8.45 per cent, and that 
on the U.S. securities was 5.74 per cent. Summing ARg and AC^ gives 
7.50 per cent. The average amount of loans held by banks during this 
time period was 2.38 billion dollars.? Now, the total welfare loss 
in this economic area can be found by estimating the area of triangle 
ABC.
Since it has already been assumed that the demand curve for each 
economic area exhibits constant elasticity throughout the relevant 
range of output, an estimate of the welfare loss cannot be provided 
by simply multiplying distance AB by BC and taking half of this value. 
This is because the demand curve is not linear. If it were, it would 
be impossible to assume that it had constant elasticity throughout.
However, the area of ABC can be derived by a iterative process. 
The intent is to estimate, as closely as possible, smaller areas 
within area ABC. By estimating smaller areas than ABC, linearity 
of the line segment AC can be approached. This process can best 
be shown by viewing Figure V-B, which represents, again, loan 
demand conditions for Economic Area 9 for the state of Florida.
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The first area to be estimated is area a_. This is done 
first by considering how much credit demanded would expand if the
Qaverage rate of interest dropped from 8.45 per cent to 8.25 per cent. 
This is where the elasticity of loan demand becomes important. For 
this economic area, a drop in the interest rate of 0.20 per cent, or
2.38 per cent of its previous value, would cause credit demand to 
expand by 8.894 x 2.38 = 21.167 per cent of its previous value.
Credit demand would then expand by 0.504 billion dollars, to 2.884 
billion dollars. We now have the necessary information to compute 
area a. Multiplying .0020 by 0.504 gives 1.008 million dollars.9 
One-half of this figure, 0.504 million dollars, gives an estimate of 
the welfare loss for area a_. Areas t>, ic, and d̂ were estimated 
in the same manner. The interest rate was arbitrarily lowered and 
credit demand was hypothetically increased by a certain amount, giving 
the dimensions for each triangle. For example, when the interest rate 
was reduced from 8.25 to 8.00, credit demanded expanded by 0.774 bil­
lion dollars. The welfare loss of area b̂ is then estimated as 
(0.777 x 0025)/2 = 0.971 million dollars. The same procedure gave 
welfare loss estimates for areas ĉ and d̂ of 1.272 and 1.680 
million dollars respectively.
OIn estimating these smaller areas for all the economic regions 
the interest rate was aribtrarily dropped by 0.25 percentage points 
unless the actual rate was a multiple of 0.25. In this case the 
average return was lowered by an amount that would result in the 
next base rate being a multiple of 0.25.
^The figure .0020 is used to convert percentages into dollars.
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To get the estimate for the entire welfare loss for area 
ABC, however, rectangles je, _f, and £ must also be estimated. The 
area of e_ is equal to .0025 times 0.504 billion dollars; the area 
of rectangle _f is equal to .0025 times 0.77 billion dollars; the area 
of rectangle is equal to .0025 times 1.017 billion dollars. The 
sum of these three rectangles is equal to 5.755 million dollars.
When this sum is auded to the estimates for areas a, _b, £, and d, 
the result is 10.182 million dollars, the amount of welfare losses 
that existed in this area, as a yearly average, for the period 1968- 
1974.
To find out the proportion of these welfare losess due to 
restrictive chartering policies the model estimated earlier in the 
chapter must be used. This model states that for every one per cent 
change in population per bank the elasticity of loan demand will change 
by 0.393 per cent. What is necessary, then, is to obtain an estimate 
of the hypothetical average number of banks that would exist for the 
years 1968 and 1974 in the absence of restrictive chartering. The 
updated Peltzman model of Chapter II will provide this estimate.
As stated on page 35 of Chapter II, had restrictive chartering not 
existed, it is estimated that 19,321 independent banks would have 
existed at the end of 1974. Had the estimation process ended in 1968,
I
the number of independent banks in existence, if restrictions had not 
existed, would have been 18,800. The hypothetical average for the 
period 1968-1974 is then 19,060, compared to the actual average of 
14,078 banks.
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The hypothetical number of banks In each economic area can be 
estimated by assuming that, for each area, the proportion of banks 
in the United States that actually existed in that area for the 
period 1968-1974 would be the same without regulation. For example, 
Economic Area 9 for the state of Florida had, for the period 1968- 
1974, an average of 77.5 banks per year. This was 0.55 per cent of 
the actual national average. It is assumed that the same proportion 
of banks would exist in the absence of chartering restrictions. Thus, 
without the regulation of new bank entry, the average number of banks 
for 1968-1974 in this economic area would be 19,060 x .0055, or 94 
banks.
Using this figure will give a new population per bank figure for
this area. With restictive chartering the actual population per bank
was 16.45 thousand people per bank. Without regulation the figure 
would have been 13.48 thousand people per bank, a 18.1 per cent 
decrease from the actual value. Now, according to the elasticity 
model presented earlier in the chapter, a 1.00 per cent change in 
population per bank causes a 0.393 per cent change in the elasticity 
of loan demand. Thus, for Economic Area 9 for the state of Florida, 
it is predicted that, in the absence of chartering restrictions, the 
elasticity of loan demand would rise by 18.1 x 0.393 ■ 7.11 per cent, 
to a value of 9.525. Using this new elasticity figure, and assuming
the new demand curve in the absence of regulation has constant elas­
ticity throughout, a new welfare loss can be estimated that is due
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solely to Imperfections in the market. Subtracting this value from 
the previously computed value will give the welfare losses from 
restrictive chartering policies.
The estimation of these new welfare losses is described in 
Figure V-C, which again represents conditions for Economic Area 9 
for the state of Florida. These new welfare losses are represented 
by area DBC. For the sake of simplicity in comparing welfare 
losses under both circumstances, it is assumed that the hypothetical 
demand curve intersects the actual curve at point C, the point which 
equated the price of loans to their opportunity cost.
What will be necessary is to work in an opposite manner from the
estimation of welfare losses in Figure V-B. Here we will start from 
point C, and then determine how much the interest rate would have to 
rise to reduce credit demand by certain finite amounts, until gradually 
point B, the actual average amount of credit extended during the 
period 1968-1974 is reached. For example, at point C, credit demanded, 
and extended, is 6.021 billion dollars. If it drops to 5.0 billion 
dollars, a reduction of 16.9 per cent, it means the interest rate had
to rise by 16.9/9.525 = 1.67 per cent from its previous value, to
7.64 per cent. This gives the dimensions for area £. The 
welfare loss represented by this area is 1/2(.0012 x 1.021) = 0.613
million dollars. Areas b, £, and were estimated in the same
manner. Credit demanded and extended was reduced by 1.0 billion
dollars in each case, except for area (i, where it was reduced by
0.62 billion dollars. Rectangles _e, _f, and £  could then be computed
121
Figure V-C
A Reestimation of Welfare Losses for Economic
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by using the dimensions of areas a, b, £, and cl. The total area 
of area DBC is 8.602 million dollars, the estimated welfare loss 
that remains even in the absence of restrictive chartering.
The final step is to subtract this figure of 8.602 million dollars 
from the actual welfare loss of 10.182 million dollars, leaving the 
welfare losses due to restrictive chartering of 1.580 million dollars. 
This means that a little over 15 per cent of total welfare losses in 
this area were due to restrictive chartering.
10This procedure was followed for all 297 economic areas. For 
the nation as a whole, the estimated welfare losses as they actually
Special care had to be taken in deriving a hypothetical popu­
lation per bank figure for statewide-branching states and those 
limited-branching areas in which inter-county branching is allowed.
A potential problem arises because the total number of independent 
banks in each county is summed over all counties. This will give a 
higher figure than for the number of independent banks in that area. 
To account for this, the proportion of total banks in that economic 
area, as listed by the FDIC, was assumed the same with and without 
regulation. Then the ratio “ B^j, where B.^ is the number of banks
i=l
in economic area i, as it actually exists, was multiplied by the 
hypothetical number of banks in the economic area without regulation 
to get an adjusted number of banks for that area. For example, the 
state of Alaska had an average of ten banks per year existing in the 
state over the years 1968-1974. This was 0.07 per cent of the total 
number of banks in the country over the same time period. Applying 
this percentage to 15,626, the number of banks in the absence of 
chartering restrictions, resulted in eleven banks. Now, during the 
period 1968-1974, the average number of banks in each county in 
Alaska, summed over all counties, was thirty, or three times the 
total number of banks in the state. Applying this ratio to the hypo­
thetical number of baqks in the absence of regulation, eleven, gives 
thirty-three, the adjusted number of banks. With a 1970 population 
of 300 thousand, the population per bank figure fell from 10.00 
thousand to 9.09 thousand.
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exist were 928.53 million dollars, while those in the absence of 
regulation were 868.99 million dollars. This means that the esti­
mated welfare losses due to the restrictions on bank chartering
were, on the average during the years 1968-1974, 59.54 million
11dollars, or 6.0 per cent of the total. A list of these welfare 
losses, by state, is shown in Appendix V-C.
^ r o m  this evidence, it appears that market imperfections are 
responsible for the vast majority of monopoly power in commercial 
banking. This dissertation does not discuss these imperfections; 
however, a good source of information on this subject can be found 
in David Alhadeff, "Barriers to Bank Entry," Southern Economic Journal. 
Vol. 40, (April, 1974), pp. 589-603.
APPENDIX V-A 
STATEWIDE ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND3 
FOR THE UNITED STATES, 1968-1974
Unlt-Bariklng States 

















A  i“Defined a s  ±1, where et j is the elasticity
nj J
of loan demand for area 1  in state and n. is 















































REGRESSION ESTIMATES FOR THE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND3
Ed Independent Variables R2 D.W.
1. log Ed
0.109 - 0.392 logXl + 0.321 logX2 - 0.324 logX3 + 0.021 logX4 
(0.20) (-7.31)* (2.28)* (-2.26)* (0.19)
.536 1.611
-0.008 logX5 + 0.283 logX6 + 0.425 logX7 + 0.771 logX8 + 0.001 X9 - 0.02 X10 
(-0.21) (4.06)* (3.40)* (12.17)* (0.04) (-0.33)
2 . log Ed
0.508 - 0.404 logXl + 0.274 logX2 - 0.222 logX3 + 0.113 logX4 
(0.96) (-7.64)* (1.97)* (-1.57) (1.02)
.550 1.599
+0.001 logX5 + 0.280 logX6 + 0.384 logX7 + 0.081 X8 + 0.019 X9 + 0.017 X10 
(0.03) (4.07)* (3.12)* (12,70)* (0.56) (0.29)
3. log Ed
0.185 - 0.399 logXl + 0.264 logX2 - 0.199 log X3 + 0.137 logX4 
(0.34) (-7.57)* (1.90) (-1.40) (1.23)
.549 1.606
+ 0.005 logX5 + 0.303 logX6 + 0.702X7 + 0.081 X8 + 0.018 X9 + 0.016 X10 
(0.13) (4.41)* (3.06)* (12.73)* (0.55) (0.27)
£




Bd Independent Variables R2 D.W.
4. log
-0.191 - 0.398 logXl + 0.284 logX2 - 0.107 logX3 + 0.166 logX4 
(0.36) (-7.61)* (2.07)* (-0.74) (1.51)
.558 1.632
+ 0.017 logX5 + 0.701 X6 + 0.841 X7 + 0.081 X8 + 0.008 X9 + 0.012 X10 
(0.42) (5.03)* (3.64)* (12.67)* (0.25) (0.21)
5. log Ej
-0.257 - 0.392 logXl + 0.291 logX2 - 0.041 logX3 + 0.222 logX4 
(-0.49) (-7.57)* (2.16)* (-0.27) (1 .88)
.560 1.717
+ 0.236 X5 + 0.810 X6 + 1.024 X7 + 0.081 X8 + 0.012 X9 + 0.015 X10 
(1.27) (4.92)* (3.84)* (12.74)* (0.36) (0.26)
6. log
- 0.577 - 0.402 logXl + 0.301 logX2 + 0.002 logX3 + 0.662 X4 
(-1.14) (-7.73)* (2.25)* (0.013) (2.35)*
.563 1.643
+ 0.286 X5 + 0.865 X6 + 1.077 X7 + 0.080 X8 + 0.014 X9 + 0.014 X10 
(1.53) (5.17)* (4.01)* (13.13)* (0.42) (0.23)
7. log Ed
-0.605 - 0.403 logXl + 0.303 logX2 +  0.042 X3 + 0.673 X4 
(-1.09) (-7.74)* (2.26)* (0 .12) (2.39)*
.563 1.644
+ 0.296 X5 + 0.873 X6 + 1.086 X7 + 0.080 X8 + 0.014 X9 + 0.014 X10 
(1.58) (5.21)* (4.04)* (13.13)* (0.43) (0.24)
APPENDIX V-B
(Continued)
Ed Independent Variables R2 D.W.
8 . log Ed
0.422 - 0.405 logXl + 0.00002 X2 + 0.039 X3 + 0.669 X4 
(2.08)* (-7.74)* (2.19)* (0.11) (2.37)*
.563 1.645
+ 0.301 X5 + 0.864 X6 + 1.096 X7 + 0.080 X8 +  0.015 X9 + 0.008 X10 
(1.60) (5.15)* (4.06)* (13.03)* (0.47) (0.12)
9. log Ed
0.291 - 0.007 XI + 0.00001 X2 - 0.217 X3 + 0.551 X4 + 0.469 X5 
(1.35) (-5.35)* (1.38) (-0.58) (1.84) (2.39)*
.519 1.666
+ 0.887 X6 + 0.901 X7 + 0.079 X8 - 0.023 X9 - 0.042 X10 
(5.05)* (3.21)* (12.25)* (-0.68) (-0.68)
10. Ed
-34.630 + 44.333 [1/(X12)] + 0.0001 X2 - 26.759 X3 + 22.941 X4 
(-1.92) (2.74)* (0.17) (-0.86) (0.96)
.378 1.756
+ 22.927 X5 + 63.811 X6 + 62.791 X7 + 4.909 X8 - 5.61 X9 - 6.88 X10 
(1.37) (4.32)* (2.67)* (9.11)* (-2.08)* (-1.32)
11. Ed
-52.828 + 56.359 (1/X1) + 0.0005 X2 - 12.101 X3 + 36.457 X4 + 15.108 X5 
(-2.93)* (4.99)* (0.67) (-0.39) (1.56) (0.92)
.413 1.737
+ 62.658 X6 + 73.543 X7 + 5.038 X8 - 2.732 X9 - 4.202 X10 
(4.37)* (3.20)* (9.20)* (-1.01) (-0.82)
APPENDIX V-B
(Continued)
Ed Independent Variables R2 D.W.
12 • Ed
- 10.711 - 0.483 XI + 0.0005 X2 - 24.032 X3 + 53.802 X4 + 31.733 X5 
(-2.29)* (-4.32)* (0.71) (-0.79) (2.18)* (1.97)*
.401 1.697
+ 60.802 X6 + 67.275 X7 + 5.277 X8 - 1.809 X9 - 4.991 X10 
(4.19)* (2.91)* (9.82)* (-0.64) (-0.96)
13. E, a
- 45.28 - 26.71 logXl + 21.49 logX2 - 25.13 logX3 + 4.06 logX4 
(-1.02) (-5.92)* (1.81) (-2.09)* (0.43)
.399 1.641
+ 0.25 logX5 + 17.34 logX6 + 36.30 logX7 + 48.10 logX8 + 0.39 X9 - 3.25 X10 
(0.07) (2.95)* (3.45)* (9.03)* (0.13) (-0.63)
Source of data: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Bank Operating Statistics, 1968 through
1974; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Functional Cost Analysis, 1966 through 1973j 
U.S.Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns, 1970, State EconomiF~5reas, 
1970; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Summary of Deposits in All Commercial Banks, 1968 and 1974.
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APPENDIX V-C
AVERAGE YEARLY WELFARE LOSSES, BY STATE, 1968-1974 
(In millions of dollars)
Welfare Losses
State With Regulation Without Regulation
Due to 
Regulation
Alabama 4.92 4.67 0.25
Alaska 3.36 3.05 0.31
Arizona 5.58 4.64 0.94
Arkansas 4.75 4.56 ■ 0.1'9
California 219.47 212.36 7.11
Colorado 18.89 18.16 0.73
Connecticut 15.12 14.03 1.09
Delaware 2.17 2.00 0.17
Florida 24.44 23.47 0.97
Georgia 18.91 18.18 0.73
Hawaii 11.46 9.42 2.04
Idaho 1.79 0.39 1.40
Illinois 6.09 5.76 0.33
Indiana 5.04 4.60 0.44
Iowa 4.81 4.39 0.42
Kansas 6.45 5.81 0.64
Kentucky 2.20 1.98 0.22
Louisiana 18.15 16.40 1.75
Maine 5.73 5.51 5.14
Maryland 2.42 2.33 0.09
Massachusetts 14.48 12.98 1.50
Michigan 28.14 26.67 1.47
Minnesota 25.47 23.07 2.40
Missouri 14.48 13.73 0.75
Montana 3.26 2.95 0.31
Mississippi 5.85 5.46 0.39
Nebraska 2.90 2.67 0.23
Nevada 6.06 5.73 0.33
New Hampshire 1.44 1.28 0.16
New Jersey 3.43 2.88 0.55
New Mexico 4.22 3.78 0.44
New York 119.74 108.09 11.65
North Carolina 29.67 27.60 2.07





State With Regulation Without Regulation
Due to 
Regulation
Ohio 14.26 12.78 1.48
Oklahoma 25.28 23.77 1.51
Oregon 17.02 15.87 1.15
Pennsylvania 6.71 6.09 0.62
Rhode Island 4.40 3.89 0.51
South Carolina 12.36 11.16 1.20
South Dakota 3.61 3.00 0.61
Tennessee 30.36 29.44 0.92
Texas 113.77 111.10 2.67
Utah 5.90 5.35 0.55
Vermont 0.44 0.33 0.11
Virginia 23.11 19.69 3.42
Washington 19.26 17.22 2.04
West Virginia 0.63 0.54 0.09
Wisconsin 6.28 5.16 1.12
Wyoming 1.12 0.95 0.17
Total 928.53 868.99 59.54
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
SUMMARY
The purpose of this dissertation was to study the effects of 
official alterations in the structure of commercial banking on social 
welfare. In doing so it was first described, in Chapter II, how these 
official actions, i.e., the restriction of new bank chartering and the 
restrictions placed on branching, have actually affected market struc­
ture in banking. It was shown that the restriction of new bank 
charters by both the Comptroller of the Currency and the various state 
banking commissions has served to reduce the rate of new bank formation 
since 1935, thus raising the number of customers being serviced by any 
one bank. Furthermore, it was shown that the state laws concerning 
branching have led to a greater population per bank the more liberal 
are branching laws.
If market structure has been altered then it is possible that 
official actions have indirectly affected bank performance. In Chapter 
III the literature concerning the relationship between market power in 
banking and banking performance was reviewed. Most of the studies 
revealed a statistical relationship between market power and bank 
performance. However, these studies usually failed to isolate any
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separate effects on performance that are caused solely by differences 
in branching laws. And those studies which tried to do so applied 
tests with such little rigor as to make them virtually meaningless.
Earlier studies also used the traditional variables, i.e., 
interest rates and loan/asset ratios as Indicators of bank performance. 
In Chapter IV it was emphasized that if one's interest were to measure 
the impact of market structure on social welfare, these two measures 
are inadequate. A theory of the banking firm was also developed in 
Chapter IV. From this theory arose the concept of the elasticity of 
loan demand as the best Indicator of how market power in banking 
affects social welfare.
Chapter V then revealed how market structure, as symbolized by 
the variable population per bank, affected the elasticity of loan 
demand for banks, and therefore Indirectly affected social welfare. 
Because the statistical relationship was negative, it could be con­
cluded that a policy of restrictions on new bank chartering, by 
raising the value of population per bank in all economic areas, has 
directly caused losses in social welfare. Furthermore, it was shown 
that there were no apparent gains from allowing banks to branch. At 
a given population per bank, the elasticity of loan demand was not 
significantly higher for either limited or statewide-branching areas 
than for unit-banking areas. Furthermore, since population per bank 
increases the more liberal are branching laws, it was concluded that 
unit-banking fostered more competition, and thus lowered welfare
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losses. The second section of the chapter actually estimated the 
welfare losses from the restrictive chartering policies.
The first step in this latter process was to compute welfare 
losses as they actually exist In each economic area. The next step 
was to estimate the amount of banks that would exist in each economic 
area in the absence of regulation. This latter estimation led to a 
hypothetically lower population per bank figure for each economic 
area. The lower figure caused the elasticity of loan demand for each 
area to increase, thus lowering welfare losses. These new welfare 
losses for each area were then computed and subtracted from the pre­
vious loss. The difference was the welfare loss due to regulation for 
each area. All three losses for each area— i.e., the losses as they 
actually exist, those that would exist in the absence of regulation, 
and the difference between these two— were then summed over all areas 
to obtain estimates for the nation as a whole.
CONCLUSIONS
At the end of Chapter V it was concluded that six per cent of 
total welfare losses in commercial banking could be attributed to 
restricting the granting of new bank charters. Obviously, this is a 
small percentage of the total. Market imperfections, i.e., economic 
as opposed to legal barriers to entry, appear to be the primary reason 
that there is a monopolistic element in the commercial banking industry. 
One should not conclude from this evidence, though, that policy makers
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do not need to be overly concerned with lifting restrictions on 
entry. Any policy that increases social welfare is certainly worth 
considering.
One way that social welfare can be significantly increased is to 
follow the recommendations of the 1971 President's Committee on 
Financial structure and Regulation (the Hunt Commission). It was 
their suggestion that mutual savings banks and savings and loan asso­
ciations be allowed to compete in the same loan markets as commercial 
banks. Presently the number of mutual savings banks and savings and 
loan associations number about one-half the number of commercial banks. 
To allow these other financial intermediaries the right to compete in 
the same loan market would, in effect, raise the number of commercial 
banks in this country by about fifty per cent. This would be expected 
to have a depressing influence on interest rates charged on loans while 
alleviating some of the restriction of loan output caused by existing 
monopolistic elements in commercial banking.
A conclusion about branching is not so easily reached. Unit- 
banking does appear to foster greater competition in the loan market, 
and for that reason leads to lower losses in social welfare than does 
limited or statewide-branching. However, this advantage of unit- 
banking is a result of considering only the prices banks charge for 
their loans. One cannot ignore the fact that population per bank 
office decreases the more liberal become branching laws. One would 
expect, then, that bank customers are at least offered more convenience
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the more liberal branching laws become. This increased convenience 
would be due to more available offices in which customers might 
use any bank service, such as check-cashing and deposit services.
The increased convenience to customers would certainly represent an 
increase in social welfare. Unfortunately this type of social wel­
fare is extremely hard to measure, and therefore was not considered 
in this dissertation.
On the basis of the evidence considered, the conclusions about 
branching, though tentative at best, is that unit-banking is optimum. 
This conclusion is at odds with the Hunt Commission report, which 
recommended that banks be allowed to branch statewide. However, the 
Hunt Commission proposal was made in the face of a scarcity of 
research on the question of whether or not some form of branch banking 
is optimum from the standpoint of social welfare. While this disser­
tation invites further research into the question, it is hoped that 
some useful knowledge has been provided by the work done here.
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